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I. INTRODUCTION
The political stalemate among the neighboring states of Geor-
gia, Alabama, and Florida over the cooperative management of the
Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint (ACF) River Basin has been
chronicled in numerous articles in the past.2 Along with the
1. Professor of Law. Florida A & M University College of Law. The author would
like to thank several friends and colleagues for their helpful comments on drafts and for
ideas that have found their way into this article. They are Pam Bush, Noah Hall, Zyg
Plater, and J. B. Ruhl. The author also wishes to thank Nicolette Tsambis, FAMU College
of Law, Class of 2008, for her research assistance and the Florida A & M University College
of Law for the research grant that supported this work.
2. See, e.g., Charles DuMars & David Seeley, The Failure of the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin and Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa River Basin Compacts and
a Guide to the Successful Establishment of Interstate Water Compacts, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
373 (2004); Carl Erhardt, The Battle over "The Hooch:" The Federal-Interstate Water Com-
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neighboring Alabama-Coosa-Tallapoosa (ACT) River Basin, the
ACF Basin was the subject of an interstate compact 3 in which the
three states solemnly covenanted to agree to try to agree,4 yet
failed.5 With efforts at negotiation effectively ended, the struggle
over the uses of the ACF Basin has resumed unabated on the wa-
ter6 and in the courts. 7
A river basin is a resource shared by many users. In Twenty-
First century America, the ACF Basin can hardly be imagined to
be an unregulated commons.8 Nevertheless, many aspects of
Garrett Hardin's famous description of "The Tragedy of the Com-
mons"9 apply. Existing regulatory controls do not consider basin-
wide best interests. Rather, existing regulatory controls only con-
pact and the Resolution of Rights in the Chattahoochee River, 11 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 200
(1992); Douglas L. Grant, Interstate Allocation of Rivers Before the United States Supreme
Court: The Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River System, 21 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 401
(2004); George William Sherk, The Management of Interstate Water Conflicts in the Twenty-
First Century: Is it time to call Uncle? 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 764 (2005); Benjamin L.
Snowden , Bargaining In The Shadow Of Uncertainty: Understanding The Failure of the
ACFAnd ACT Compacts, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 134 (2005); C. Hansell Watt, IV, Who Gets
the Hooch? Georgia, Florida, and Alabama Battle for Water from the Apalachicola-
Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 55 MERCER. L. REV 1453 (2004).
3. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3; Josh Clemons, Interstate Water Disputes: A Road
Map for States, 12 SE. ENvTL. L.J. 115, 129-31, 137-39 (2004).
4. ACF Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997); ACT Compact, Pub. L.
No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2233 (1997).
5. In September 2003, Florida broke the ACF compact with Georgia and Alabama; in
August 2004, Alabama halted negotiations for the ACT compact. J.B. Ruhl, Water Wars,
Eastern Style: Divvying Up the Apalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin, 131 J. CON-
TEMP. WATER RES. & EDUC. 47, 50 (2005).
6. See, e.g., Press Release, Gov. Sonny Perdue, Moratorium on Water Permits for
Flint River Basin to be Lifted (Mar. 11, 2006), available at http://www.gov.state.ga.us
/press/2006/presslO87.shtml (last visited June 13, 2006). See also Robert Abrams, Georgia
DNR Issues The Flint River Basin Regional Water Development and Conservation Plan:
Moratorium on Farm Water Use Permits Lifted, 1 E. WATER L. & PoVy REP. 174 (2006).
7. Robert Abrams, Eleventh Circuit Refuses to Enjoin U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
from Taking Steps to Finalize Lake Lanier Water Supply Contracts, 1 E. WATER L. & POLY
REP. 22 (2006). See also, Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117 (11th Cir. 2005). Both
the article and the Eleventh Circuit decision include a reasonable synopsis of the tri-partite
litigation over the operation of the Chattahoochee River dams by the Corps of Engineers
(Corps). The three strands of litigation were all brought in different federal jurisdictions.
This Eleventh Circuit decision was brought by Alabama (joined later by Florida) against the
Corps in Alabama federal court. A suit by Georgia was brought against the Corps in the
Georgia federal court, and a suit by power producers was brought against the Corps in the
District of Columbia federal court. On July 25, 2006, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of Alabama denied a motion by Florida for an order requiring the
Corps to maintain releases from the lowest dam in the system at 6,300 cfs until the date
scheduled for release of the Fish and Wildlife Service biological opinion finding there had
not been a "take" of an endangered species. Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, 441 F. Supp. 2d.
1123, 1124 (N.D. Ala. 2006).
8. A sampling of the laws affecting the basin includes the following: Federal Water
Power Act of 1920, 16 U.S.C. § 791(a)-828(c) (2000); Fort Gains Project, Pub. L. No. 85-363,
72 Stat. 73 (1958); Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-525, 60 Stat. 634 (1946);
Water Supply Acts, 43 U.S.C.A § 390 (2000).
9. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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sider much narrower decisional criteria. Individuals and economic
entities that use the ACF resourceplex, like Hardin's cow herds,
remain encouraged to seek to maximize their beneficial use of the
resource. 10 In a fragmented and incomplete regulatory regime, the
naked self-help appropriation of the benefits that typify users of
Hardin's unregulated commons is replaced by the effort to win
those same benefit-internalizing and cost-externalizing outcomes
in the regulatory forum. Therein lies the need for cumulative and
cooperative interstate management.
At the Ecosystem Services Symposium, this point was well
made by the presentations of both Professor Neuman and Profes-
sor Tarlock: fragmented or special interest-dominated manage-
ment of a unitary resource will not achieve good long term results.
In Professor Neuman's chronicle of Oregon's Tillamook State For-
est, the political pressure of well-organized and self-interested con-
stituencies undermines the power of a management agency having
sufficient breadth of authority to sustainably protect ecosystem
services." Equally, in Professor Tarlock's description of the
Klamath River Basin, the Bureau of Reclamation, an agency with
its own mission-driven agenda and local constituency, cannot re-
liably manage a resource in a way that protects ecosystem services
for the longer term,12 particularly in the face of extreme interest
group pressure and political opportunism on the part of the Bush
administration. 13
This Article will canvas parallel ground in relation to the ACF
Basin. In addition, this Article will consider the usual mantra
about why the legal deck appears to be stacked against the bottom
of the basin where the principal benefits of the water are derived
from the ecological systems that are supported by a more natural
flow regime.14 After that, however, the Article will explain how the
10. This simplistic behavioral assumption underpins a great deal of welfare econom-
ics. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICs 3 (3d ed. 2000).
Those assumptions are not a perfect reflection of human motivation and behavior, but they
are a sufficiently accurate generalization to have predictive and descriptive utility.
11. See Janet Neuman, Thinking Inside the Box: Looking for Ecosystem Services
Within a Forested Watershed, 22 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 173 (2007).
12. See A. Dan Tarlock, Ecosystem Services in the Klamath basin: Battlefield Casual-
ties or the Future?, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 209 (2007).
13. See, e.g., Tom Hamburger, Water Saga Illuminates Rove's Methods; Bush Strate-
gist Works Agencies in Bid to Make Policy Decisions Jibe with Political Goals, WALL ST. J.,
July 30, 2003, at A4.
14. The upstream/downstream dichotomy is frequently going to dictate the power of a
state to unilaterally impose its decisions on a neighbor. States abutting lakes or rivers also
may find the actions of their neighbor incompatible with their desired use of the waterbody.
See discussion of interstate lake pollution infra Part III.B. Upstream effects are relatively
rare, but the movement of fish in an interstate stream might give the upstream state a
claim. See infra Part III.B. Also, in the west, where priority of use plays so prominent a
role in the fabric of water allocation law, an upstream state could be the later developing
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greatly expanded understanding of ecosystem services that has
come about in recent decades can be a counterweight to insular
decisionmaking. The legal vehicle for that transformation is inter-
state public nuisance and the core principles of state sovereignty
that it enables. Neither of two late twentieth century develop-
ments, preemption by comprehensive federal water pollution con-
trol legislation nor a change in equitable apportionment doctrine,
are sufficient to contradict that conclusion.
II. DECISIONS REGARDING THE ACF BASIN
As a highly simplified matter, the ACF Basin has three distinct
parts. In the north and west, the features of greatest consequence
are the Chattahoochee River and the two major United States
Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) dams on its mainstem that con-
trol the river's flow. The upstream Burford Dam, that forms Lake
Lanier in proximity to the metropolitan Atlanta area, is a flash-
point for efforts to influence how the Corps manages both the lake
levels and the timing of its releases. The parties most ardently
contending for the Corps' favor are Atlanta and nearby municipali-
ties, hydroelectric power providers, and users in Alabama and
Florida far downstream who rely on ecosystem services and related
benefits that the river has historically been available to provide.
The Corps' operations at dams lower on the Chattahoochee River
have more recently become a focus of debate.
The second distinct part of the ACF system is its east and cen-
tral feature, the Flint River, that flows southward through central
Georgia and then turns west to join the Chattahoochee River and
form the Apalachicola River at the border with Florida and Ala-
bama. This rural central Georgia region is dominated by irrigated
agriculture that depends on direct withdrawals from the Flint
River and, increasingly, on pumping hydrologically connected
groundwater. The irrigation increases agricultural yields. His-
torically, the Flint River is responsible for somewhat more than
forty percent of the basin's summer flow. In this part of the basin,
the regulator is the Georgia Department of Natural Resources En-
vironmental Protection Division (EPD) which is charged with per-
mitting responsibilities for withdrawals of water. 15 The contest-
ants seeking EPD's favor in this context are the mid-Georgia farm-
ers and the environment, both the riparian environment in the
Flint Basin and downstream, as the Apalachicola flows through
state and face a claim that the water is already committed to downstream use. See discus-
sion of the Vermejo River cases infra Part III.C and note 97.
15. See discussion infra Part II.C and notes 47-48.
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Florida to sustain the river's delta and the estuarine environment
of Apalachicola Bay in the Gulf of Mexico.
The third distinct part of the system is the Apalachicola sys-
tem. That river meanders through the ecologically rich Florida
panhandle and then provides critical freshwater flows into the
Apalachicola bay. This is a sparsely populated region rich in sce-
nic beauty. Economically, this region derives its benefits directly
from the ecosystem services-literally harvesting some of them by
oystering, but also by taking advantage of the beauty to promote
tourism and recreational water use.
With three so distinct features, and with a geopolitical posture
spanning three states having differing relationships to the resour-
ceplex, the decision of how the ACF Basin should be used is a
source of conflict. There have been serious efforts by the three
states to manage the basin as a whole by interstate compact. Both
preceding that effort and in its wake are actions by the Corps on
the Chattahoochee and the EPD on the Flint that are determining
the uses made of the basin's waters.
A. Interstate Compacts as a Mechanism for Comprehensive
Basin Management
In the ACF basin, the comprehensive management story is no
better than in most basins; some might contend it is worse. Early
in the 1990s, the ACF dispute became heated when the Corps indi-
cated it would try to make permanent a decade old temporary
practice of providing excess water to Atlanta area water agencies
to increase municipal supply.16 Alabama and, shortly thereafter,
Florida, made legal objections. 17 Georgia intervened on the side of
the Corps and the case promptly moved from court to the negotiat-
ing table.18 The negotiations were protracted, lasting more than a
decade. The negotiations were carried out in good faith, as evi-
denced by the unusual step that the parties took. They entered
into an interstate compact, the purpose of which was to work out
an agreed allocation of the basin's waters. 19 Eventually, the states
failed to agree as hoped and the allocation issue returned to the
courts. 20
16. This history is recounted in Georgia v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 302 F.3d 1242,
1246-49 (11th Cir. 2002).
17. The history of this branch of the litigation is best set out in Alabama v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1121-23 (11th Cir. 2005).
18. Memorandum of agreement between Alabama, Florida, Georgia, and United
States Army, Jan. 3, 1992.
19. ACF Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-104, art. I, 111 Stat. 2219 (1997).
20. The Compact was terminated on September 1, 2003. At that time, the sovereign
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In the ACF Basin, the chance for a holistic view of the basin as
the foundation for management died with the failed ACF Compact
(Compact). In fact, as is the case in most shared basins over which
there is a significant degree of interstate competition for the water,
the chances for holistic management were slight even before the
Compact failed. As the desired endpoint of the effort was quanti-
fied allocation in the ACF, the chances for comprehensive man-
agement had been diminished by the Compact itself, which simply
referred to its intent as follows: "to develop an allocation formula
for equitably apportioning the surface waters of the ACF Basin
among the states while protecting the water quality, ecology and
biodiversity of the ACF ... ,"21 Had a water allocation of the kind
the Compact contemplated been achieved, a simple division of the
available water, the Compact would not have managed the basin's
water in a comprehensive or holistic fashion.22 Florida understood
that mere allocation was inadequate from its perspective. David
Struhs, Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental
Protection, was quoted as saying, "Florida was unable to accept
only minimum flows, plus whatever else the upstream states were
not able to consume or store. This would place too great a risk on
one of the most naturally productive rivers and bays in the United
States., 23
Simple water allocation, almost invariably, is the enemy of
well-coordinated basin management. Allocation quantifies rights
and obligations in each of the party states. States treat their allo-
cation as an insular umbrella of entitlement under which a state's
water users operate in relative isolation from concerns relating to
the sustenance of the larger resource.24 As long as delivery obliga-
tions are the defining element of the compact, the upstream state
has no economic self-interest or legal obligation to maximize the
benefits downstream. Rather, a fairly predictable scenario would
be for an upstream state to regulate its use to provide water to-
ward its downstream delivery obligation in low demand seasons
(typically October through May)25 and restrict the water released
protagonists returned to the court trying to legally constrain the Corps' choices.
21. ACF Compact, art. VII, 111 Stat. at 2222-23.
22. Cf. DuMars & Seeley, supra note 2, at 374-75 (describing the variety of delivery
obligation clauses present in interstate compacts).
23. Florida to take Georgia, Alabama to court over water rights, U.S. WATER NEWS
ONLINE, Sept. 2003, http://www.uswaternews.com/archives/arcrights/3floto9.html.
24. Robert H. Abrams, Secure Water Rights in Interstate Waters, in WATER LAW:
TRENDS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICE, 330, 331-334 (Kathleen Marion Carr & James D. Cram-
mond, eds. 1995); Robert Haskell Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary
Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 155, 169-70 (2002).
25. In the Flint River portion of the ACF Basin, the irrigation season is April through
September. See discussion infra Part II.C and note 47.
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to flow downstream in high demand seasons. In many cases, as in
the ACF, the high demand season is the summer growing season is
also the hydrologic low flow season. In that scenario, the upstream
state maximizes its benefits by reducing flow by the greatest
amount when the river's hydrograph is already at a low flow
stage.26 This is rational management under an annual delivery
obligation, but poor management of the resourceplex.
Two compacts have departed significantly from a simple deliv-
ery obligation allocation model: the Delaware River Compact 27 and
the Susquehanna River Compact.28 These two compacts give the
compact commission broad regulatory powers that allow for basin
management and coordination of activities in the signatory states
to best serve the larger interests of the basin. In the Delaware
River Compact, the managerial power is coordinated with the cen-
tral allocational principles that, in a very general way, balance
New York City's water supply interests against the remaining ba-
sin uses. Nevertheless, the power of the Delaware River Basin
Commission (DRBC) has provided numerous opportunities for bas-
inwide benefit maximizing projects and policies.29
An example of the DRBC at its best was its response after a
record drought in the 1960s eclipsed the drought of 1929-33.30
This earlier drought had served as the previous basis for the
maximum diversions and minimum releases from New York City's
Delaware Basin reservoirs that were established by a Supreme
Court decree in 1954.31 Through the 1960s drought and subse-
quent dry periods, the Commission provided a forum for the basin
states and New York City to negotiate a series of ad hoc reductions
to the out-of-basin diversions accorded New York City and to the
minimum flows it was required to maintain in the main stem
Delaware River at Montague, New Jersey.32
In the late 1970s, the Commission convened the Decree Par-
ties, including the four basin states and New York City, for inten-
sive good faith negotiations to improve interstate water manage-
ment in the basin, particularly during drought. Over a period of
three years, the parties reached a set of consensus recommenda-
26. See the ACF Basin Flow Appendix for a figure that depicts the Flint River annual
hydrograph, http://waterdata.usgs.gov.
27. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688 (1961).
28. Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970).
29. The details enumerated in the examples of DRBC functioning that follow were
provided to the author by Pamela M. Bush who currently serves as Secretary and Assistant
General Counsel of the Delaware River Basin Commission [hereinafter Pamela M. Bush
Testimony].
30. Id.
31. See New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995, 995-1002 (1954).
32. Pamela M. Bush Testimony, supra, note 29.
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tions, including a set of drought operating curves, which, with the
benefit of incremental tweaks in later years, called for stepped
down diversions by both New York and New Jersey and propor-
tional reductions in the Montague flow target during conditions
defined as "drought watch," "drought warning" and "drought."
With the consent of the Decree parties, these curves were adopted
as regulations by the DRBC in 1982. Since then, objective indica-
tors trigger certain reductions automatically, enhancing the de-
pendability of Delaware Basin water supplies by conserving water
in the City's drinking water reservoirs while simultaneously pro-
tecting downstream uses. Other good faith recommendations en-
acted as DRBC regulations allow the Commission to draw on pri-
vate power company reservoirs and state and federal multi-
purpose reservoirs to augment Delaware River flows in order to
repel salt and protect water supply intakes in the Delaware Estu-
ary and Bay, while also allowing New York City to maintain ade-
quate water levels in its reservoirs.
The Commission is not rooted in place; instead, it adapts its
management to changing understandings of the basin's cumulative
best interest. For example, the Commission acknowledged and re-
sponded to a steadily increasing demand by the public for instream
flows to protect ecological and recreational uses by adaptively
managing the water resources. Flows were increased to meet the
needs of aquatic life and the demands of anglers, boaters, and
other recreational users that are now deemed a vital management
objective, although such needs were not contemplated by the Su-
preme Court when it apportioned the waters of the Delaware River
fifty years ago.33
In this endeavor, the DRBC has reached out to embrace new
partners. For example, a key advisory subcommittee on Ecological
Flows, created in 2003 to advise DRBC's Regulated Flow Advisory
Committee, is chaired by a Nature Conservancy staffer. Similarly,
the Delaware River Foundation, a group comprised of fishing
guides and others whose livelihoods depend upon the cold water
fishery created by New York City's reservoir releases, is a key
partner in defining the shortcomings of past release regimes and
in proposing alternatives. Through the Commission's advisory
committees and other collaborations, DRBC is building a common
base of knowledge and consensus in the Basin community on such
vital topics as the need for additional storage. A study is under-
way for expanding two of the New York City reservoirs, while a
sophisticated flow model is shared by participants to test different
33. See New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
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release scenarios for operating the existing reservoirs. The study
results will provide the basis for instituting improved release re-
gimes in the future. This process exemplifies the ability of an in-
stitution like the DRBC to continually assimilate new information
and participants, to coordinate the activities of these participants,
and to generate multiple alternative solutions to water resource
problems.
Taking a step back and comparing the DRBC to the more typi-
cal allocation compact commission, it is evident that the DRBC
atypically approaches its basin without allocation as its mantra.
Part of its success in this regard is attitudinal-the Commission
has always operated as a regional manager, not a commission
made up of state players representing their individual interests
under a fixed allocation. No doubt there are functional manage-
ment imperatives, such as maintaining an adequate supply of wa-
ter for New York City. Nevertheless, the DRBC has been able to
honor those real-world water supply imperatives, the Commission
while also establishing multi-state basinwide benefits as its goal.
No one successfully championed this sort of basin management
structure for the ACF.
B. "Management" by Mission-Driven Agencies
Throughout the compact process in the ACF basin, the Corps
continued to manage the Chattahoochie basin according to its own
plans for operations with little fanfare. Perhaps the parties be-
lieved that the compact process would effectively supplant the
Corps' role in water allocation by making it subordinate to the
compact agreement. 34 Whatever may have transpired in the wake
of a successful compact allocation, with the failure of the ACF
Compact, the Corps was again front and center.
The Corps, in addition to controlling the operation of the larg-
est dams in the system, also controls the award of many of the sys-
34. The ACF Compact in Article X(c) addressed the relationship to other laws and the
Corps' dam operations. The Compact, due to congressional ratification, enjoys the status of
federal legislation. It states that the Corps and other federal agencies, "to the maximum
extent practicable, shall exercise their discretion in carrying out their responsibilities, pow-
ers, and authorities over water resources in the ACF Basin and water resource facilities in
the ACF Basin in a manner consistent with and that effectuates the allocation formula de-
veloped pursuant to this Compact." What that language did not do is change the mandates
of the federal laws that govern Corps operations in the basin. In practical effect, the lan-
guage of that provision removed most of the Corps' discretion to allocate excess water, but
did not change its obligations in managing for statutory purposes of power generation and
flood control, for example. The Compact would not have taken fights about Corps' deci-
sionmaking out of the equation, but it would have limited the contests among the states in
that regard. ACF Compact, Pub. L. No. 105-105, 111 Stat. 2233, 2239-40 (1997).
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tem's water benefits among the competing resourceplex users. The
Corps' operation of its dams not only affects the upstream-
downstream distribution of benefits, but also mediates competing
claims to upstream benefits. Cities want the Corps' dams operated
to ensure them of secure and increased water supply as a primary
goal and of summer flat-water lake-based recreation as a secon-
dary goal. That management regime is, to a considerable degree,
in conflict with the interests of hydropower producers whose gen-
eration opportunities are directly impacted by the withdrawal of
water for municipal use from the system that bypasses the outlet
dams. Power producers are also affected by the timing of releases
from the Corps' dams and by the holding of water as a hedge
against drought. In a somewhat oversimplified view, that conflict
has three prongs: diversion, storage, and timing. The power pro-
ducers on the Chattahoochee River desire to have all of the water
in reservoirs released through the dams. They want substantial
releases in the summer, which is their period of peak demand, and
at other times the power producers want reliable releases so that
they can plan their mix of power sources efficiently. The cities
want some of the water diverted from the reservoirs for municipal
use. For those diversions the return flow, if any,35 would be re-
leased below the dam. The cities, consistent with prudent flood
control, also want Lake Lanier kept as full as possible. This gives
them a hedge against future droughts and, concurrently, maxi-
mizes recreational opportunities for the inhabitants of the metro-
politan region.
The Corps' decision regarding municipal diversions, timing,
and releases, flows downstream to the ACF Basin's other users.
The resultant operating regime, to whatever degree it favors the
cities, is likely to be suboptimal for other users whether it is the
hydropower suppliers, the irrigators in the middle of the basin, or
those who benefit from summer freshwater fisheries. Still other
users, such as the oystering community in Apalachicola Bay, who
require the river to retain its natural flow patterns, are likely to
suffer losses when the Corps operations do not mimic natural
35. In a national trend, more and more sewage effluent is being reused for landscape
and golf course irrigation rather than being returned to the rivers. There are a number of
benefits to this practice. On the quantity/supply side, (1) the treated effluent is substituted
for additional withdrawals of groundwater or surface water and (2) the water is being sub-
stituted for more expensive potable water deliveries. On the quality side, even though
treated, the sewage effluent is, in most cases, of lower quality than the receiving body qual-
ity, especially in regard to nutrients. This is a significant problem in many riverine envi-
ronments. See, e.g., Ariz. Pub. Serv. Co. v. Long, 773 P.2d 988 (Ariz. 1989). See also, e.g., G.
Oliver Melgar, Sewage Effluent Happens: But Who Has the Right to Its Beneficial Use?, 24 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 587 (2004); Robert Abrams, Northeast Florida Increases
Residential Irrigation with Treated Sewage Effluent, 1 E. WATER L. & POLY REP. 167 (2006).
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flows. If, however, the Corps operated the dams on a pass-through
basis, mimicking the natural hydrograph (other than to prevent
major flooding), the cities and power producers would be harmed.
In that way, the Corps is a de facto river basin manager.36 The
Corps, acting pursuant to its legal authority, decides who gets to
use the water at what time and thereby imposes external costs on
the loser of the allocation contest.
The Corps enjoys several layers of authority when it operates
the dams under its control. The first layer is dam-specific, that is,
every dam has legislation that authorizes it and specifies the pur-
poses for which the dam is to be operated, or the program of which
the dam is a part, which in turn will have program purposes that
attach to the dam by reference. For example, on the Chattahoo-
chee, Buford Dam that forms Lake Lanier was authorized by the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1945. 37 That legislation effectively des-
ignated flood control and hydroelectric generation as the sole pur-
poses for the dam.38 The legislative history and the report of Lt.
Gen. R. A. Wheeler, Chief of Engineers that described the ration-
ale for the dam, indicated that downstream navigation in the Apa-
lachicola River and municipal water supply for Atlanta were ad-
junct benefits of the dam, but "Congress gave no priority to the use
of Lake Lanier's waters for such purposes," nor were any of the
costs of the project allocated to either of those purposes.39 That
mandate was supplemented by more general authority granted to
the Corps by the Water Supply Act of 195840 and, possibly, the
Flood Control Act of 1962. 41 The Water Supply Act expressly al-
lows the Corps to reallocate water under its control to municipal
supply. However, congressional authorization is required if the
36. The Corps has painful experiences of being cast in that role. See Sandra B. Zell-
mer, A New Corps of Discovery for Missouri River Management, 83 NEB. L. REv. 305 (2004);
see also JOSEPH SAX, ET AL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER RESOURCES 87-97 (4th ed. 2006)
[hereinafter SAX, LEGAL CONTROL].
37. Act of July 24, 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634.
38. See George William Sherk, The Corps' Conundrum: Reconciling Conflicting Statu-
tory Requirements in the ACF River Basin, PROCEEDINGS OF 2005 GA. WATER RESOURCES
CONF.,U. GA. 1 (Apr. 25-27, 2005), available at http://www.uga.edu/water/GWRC/Papers/
SherkJ%20Corps%20Conundrum.pdf [hereinafter Sherk, Conundrum].
39. Id. at 2.
40. 43 U.S.C. § 390b (2000).
41. Pub. L. No. 87-874, § 203, 76 Stat. 1173, 1182 (1962). The Flood Control Act of
1962 served as authorization for the West Point Dam which sits downstream of the Buford
Dam and has no direct application to Buford Dam. The shared flood control purpose can,
accordingly, be served by coordinated management of the two dams. The ambiguity here is
that the portion of the 1962 legislation authorizing the West Point Dam also gives a high
priority to fish, wildlife, and recreational use of West Point Lake. Jerry Sherk argues that
this later-in-time authority favoring fish, wildlife, and recreation values downstream limits
the Corps' discretion in managing Buford Dam to favor other purposes. Sherk, Conundrum,
supra note 38, at 3.
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reallocation "[W]ould seriously affect the purposes for which the
project was authorized .. . [or] involve major structural or opera-
tional changes" 42
With the Corps operating pursuant to that framework, the ef-
forts to manipulate the water outcomes by "winning" with the
Corps come into clearer view. Atlanta, needing increased munici-
pal supply, obtained it first by receiving temporary allocations
which the Corps did not believe met the threshold for requiring
congressional approval as a reallocation due to their temporary,
albeit recurrent, nature. When Atlanta municipalities wanted to
further increase the amount and make the source secure, it trig-
gered the 1989 determination of the Corps that it was time to seek
congressional authorization to reallocate storage space in Lake
Lanier for municipal and industrial water supply. This would al-
low the Corps to enter into the proposed water storage contracts
with local water supply providers. That choice by the Corps pro-
voked the two losers in the process, the hydropower producers and
the downstream states, to take action (litigation) to try to force a
different outcome than the one that the Corps had selected as its
plan for the Basin's waters.
What matters here is not the wisdom of the Corps' decision.
Rather, the importance rests with what factors the Corps was le-
gally required to consider, legally permitted to consider, and what
factors it was legally required to ignore. Arguing for the narrow
view, the Corps has its mission prescribed for it by Congress and
can manage the resource only for the explicit statutory purposes
relating to Buford Dam, flood control, and hydropower. That man-
agement does not consider the downstream effects. Even under
the Water Supply Act, the calculus is whether there is water sur-
plus to the authorized purposes of the dam in question that can be
allocated to municipal supply. Again, that decision takes no ac-
count of downstream effects.43 It is possible to argue somewhat
42. 43 U.S.C. § 390b(d) (2000).
43. Colonel Bob Keyser, one of the Corps key players in the ACF management, es-
poused a broad view of the Corps' sense of its role and authority. He stated at the Appala-
chicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Stakeholder's Meeting, held December 5, 2002 in
Columbus, GA, on ACF issues facing the Corps:
I'm sure you all have heard before the seven purposes to the ACF sys-
tem, seven authorized purposes: navigation, hydropower, fish and wild-
life, flood control, recreation, water supply, water quality.. .And I dare-
say that everybody in this room has got a claim to the water in the ACF
system for one of those purposes.. .My job is to balance all those seven
purposes and the needs of everybody that's in this room, realizing a lot of
those are competing interests a lot of times.
Transcript of the Appalachicola-Chattahoochee-Flint River Basin Stakeholder's Meeting,
254 [Vol. 22.2
NARROW PERSPECTIVES
formally that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA) mandates the Corps to evaluate downstream environ-
mental effects in the decisional process leading up to seeking legis-
lative authorization for reallocation to municipal supply. 4" That is
part of the literal command of NEPA, but that law has been au-
thoritatively interpreted to have no substantive impact.45 The eco-
system services in the bottom of the basin, even if studied by the
Corps, are not meaningful contenders for water allocation when
the Corps manages the Buford Dam and effectively determines the
largest component of the flow regime on the Chattahoochee
River.46
C. Management by Single-State Authority
The Corps is not alone as a de facto resourceplex manager in
the ACF Basin. The Georgia Environmental Protection Division of
the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (EPD) is given pri-
mary control in the administration of Georgia's waters including
both surface water 7 and groundwater.48 EPD permits are re-
quired for water withdrawals for industrial, municipal, or agricul-
tural use that have the capacity to exceed 100,000 gallons per
day.49 Thus, EPD has the power to control irrigation and other
uses of Flint River water and hydrologically connected groundwa-
ter from the Floridan Aquifer.
The mutually reinforcing combination of drought and increased
irrigation activities by Flint River Basin farmers thrust EPD
squarely into the middle of Flint River management. A severe
drought that began in 1998 prompted all existing water with-
11-12 (Dec. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.sam.usace.army.milbriefings/ACT-ACF/ACFMtgl2-05-02Transcript.pdf.
44. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (codi-
fied as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (2000)). Proposals for legislation are agency
actions that require an Environmental Impact Statement. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2000). Sub-
section (v) of that provision further makes clear the timing of the EIS is such that it "shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes." Id.
45. Somewhat unhelpfully in this setting, NEPA insists that the Corps consider alter-
natives that can ameliorate adverse environmental effects, but section 105 of NEPA, 42
U.S.C. § 4335 (2000), makes NEPA's policies and goals "supplementary to those set forth in
existing authorizations" has not been construed in a substantive manner that would grant
the Corps authority to allocate water to environmental purposes.
46. The one exception to this statement is the requirements imposed on the Corps by
section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000). A recent effort to
control Corps' action on that basis has, thus far, failed. See Alabama v. Corps of Eng'rs, No.
CV-90-BE-01331-E, 2006 WL 2106991 (N.D. Ala. July 25, 2006). See discussion infra Part
II.C.
47. Georgia Water Quality Control Act, GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-20 to -53 (2006).
48. Ground-water Use Act of 1972, GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-90 to -107 (2006).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(a)(1)(A) (2006) (surface water); § 12-5-96 (a)(1) (2006)
(groundwater).
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drawal permit holders to begin using maximum amounts and gen-
erated a veritable flood of new groundwater irrigation permit ap-
plications. Most of the groundwater being sought in the new per-
mits was to be pumped from areas of the Floridan Aquifer that
produce large amounts of tributary groundwater that constitute
the base flow of the Flint River. Even before most of the permit
applications were considered, already permitted withdrawals of
ground and surface water began to dry up segments of the Flint
River, particularly in the southern reaches of the basin. Already
existing models and studies that had been conducted up to that
time predicted "a severe impact on the Flint River and some of its
tributaries under conditions of drought and increased irrigation
withdrawals from the Floridan aquifer."50 As a response, the Di-
rector of EPD, on October 23, 1999, invoked statutory authority to
develop the Flint River Basin Regional Water Development and
Conservation Plan (Flint Plan),51 to study the basin and set operat-
ing parameters for EPD in its permitting activities.
Announcing the Flint Plan had a paradoxical short-term effect
as it significantly increased irrigation withdrawals because of the
permit rush it engendered.52 In basins subject to such a plan,
permits issued for twenty-five years or more, which include farm
use permits, can only be issued in accordance with the plan. The
announcement that there would be a Flint River Basin Plan
sparked an immediate spike in permit applications of would-be-
irrigators hoping to get a permit that would not be subject to
whatever restrictions the Flint Plan called on EPD to impose. Ap-
proximately 1,500 such applications were received between Octo-
ber 23 and the end of November, 1999, and were acted upon under
the old standards for permits during the following year.53 EPD
thereafter responded to the continuing application rush with a
moratorium, indicating it would process no new permit applica-
tions received after December 1, 1999 until after the entire study
of the basin and a plan for its acceptable management could be
completed. 54
50. GA. DEP'T OF NATURAL RES. ENVTL PROT. Div., FLINT RIVER BASIN REGIONAL WA-
TER DEVELOPMENT CONSERVATION PLAN 37 (2006), http://www.gadnr.org/frbp/Assets/
Documents/Plan22.pdf [hereinafter FLINT PLAN].
51. See GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-31(h) (2006) (surface water); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-96(e)
(2006) (groundwater).
52. The Flint Plan does not give a figure for how much water was involved only the
number of such permits which represents at least a seven percent increase in the number of
permitted withdrawals.
53. EPD believed that many of those applications were duplicates; they eventually
acted upon 900 such applications during the next year. FLINT PLAN supra note 50, at 39-41.
54. FLINT PLAN supra note 50, at 39. Since the moratorium, 1,134 permits have been
"backlogged" representing requests to irrigate an additional 95,000 acres. Id. at 30, 41.
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Basinwide on the Flint there is some mix of uses, but the real
subject of the Flint Plan is irrigation and that concern dominates
over all others. Municipal and industrial (M&I) uses are few. In
the less stressed northern part of the basin "permitted [M&I] use
is substantially less than agricultural water use."5 5 In the critical
southern part of the basin, "[Tiotal M&I withdrawals represent
less than 3% of agricultural irrigation withdrawals . . . [and] their
cumulative impact on stream-aquifer flux and the regional ground-
water budget is negligible."56
The Flint Plan is a good effort in some regards. It is replete
with carefully developed data. As reports of this kind go, the EPD
Flint Plan is more transparent than most. 57 It acknowledges that
it is trying to find a decision matrix that allows the maximum eco-
nomic development consistent with acceptable levels of adverse
ecological impacts.58 As it considers setting the maximum allow-
able withdrawals, the Flint Plan indicates cognizance of legal re-
straints imposed by (1) the federal Endangered Species Act, 9 (2)
the federal Clean Water Act,60 (3) property rights of riparians as
recognized by Georgia's regulated riparianism regime, and (4)
property rights related to Georgia's groundwater law.6 1
The Flint Plan, however, is not a balanced document. It sets as
its regulatory goal the maximization of agricultural productivity
from irrigation use of water consistent with maintaining the
minimum amount of water in the river necessary to avoid illegal
breaches of ecological protection responsibilities. 62 The Flint Plan
is candid. For example, the Flint Plan anticipates that its regula-
tory choices regarding past and future permitting in the most
stressed regions of the Flint Basin will over-allocate the available
water in low flow years with an adverse effect on the mussel popu-
lations and the Gulf striped bass population.63 Even so, rather
55. Id. at 95.
56. Id. at 96.
57. The Flint Plan describes its methodologies carefully and, when methodological
tradeoffs (e.g., expected cost of better data versus expected value of better data) are made,
the Flint Plan notes them and what assumptions, if any, are used to address issues that the
added data may have disclosed.
58. FLINT PLAN supra note 50, at 41-42. Perhaps hinting at how the balance might be
tilted, Section 1.3, entitled "Conservation, development, and ecologic sustainability" begins
that "An important aspect of this Plan is to consider the economic impact of any actions that
would affect agricultural irrigation. Agriculture in Georgia is a $9.9 billion industry, and
$1.9 billion of that is derived from agriculture in southwest Georgia..." Id. at 41.
59. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2000).
60. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).
61. FLINT PLAN supra note 50, at 42-44.
62. Id. at 52.
63. See id. at 51-52 acknowledging (but not reducing) "the amount of water currently
withdrawn for agricultural irrigation in drought years increases both the magnitude and
duration of low flows in streams of the FRB, thus further harming endangered species and
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than limit additional permits, the Plan opts to rely on the Flint
River Drought Protection Act,64 under which the state must pur-
chase forbearance from permit holding agricultural users to main-
tain critical stream flow. 6 5 Apart from being a bit of a fiscal alba-
tross, the Flint River Drought Protection Act is unfunded and thus
requires explicit legislative action to appropriate the money.
Moreover, there is a chance that the statute will be inoperative in
any year in which the severity of the drought is not foreseen before
March 1, the date that marks the beginning of the spring planting
season.6 6 On the positive side, permits issued after the Plan is in
place will require farmers to use conservation measures during
periods of water shortage, but most of the water will already be
allocated under pre-Plan permits that, together, already over-
allocate water in times of shortage.6 7
Given the state of affairs in the basin in low flow years, the
Flint Plan treatment of the Endangered Species Act appears in-
adequate. There are four fresh water mussels and one species of
gulf sturgeon found in southwest Georgia that are listed by the
United States Fish & Wildlife Service (FWS) as endangered.68
When it estimates costs of its alternatives, the Flint Plan describes
very considerable impacts of the combination of drought and low
flow that it will permit. Freshwater mussel populations in six
separate stream stretches will suffer fifty to one-hundred percent
die-offs. 69 The Flint Plan is clearly not the sort of approach that
the FWS had in mind. The portion of the FWS website relating to
potentially limiting the amount of water available for all users." See also, infra text accom-
panying note 74 (discussing striped bass fishery).
64. GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-540 (2006).
65. In two past low flow years the state paid roughly $10 million to prevent permitted
irrigation in the lower Flint Basin. These payments to the farmers combine with the fact
that the irrigation is, in part, driven by crop subsidies. See discussion infra Part II.C.
66. This was the case in 2006 when a failure to appreciate the onset of drought led to
passage of the March 1st date by which the Flint River Drought Protection Act could be
triggered. In relation to the watering bans, put in statewide in response to the drought,
Nap Caldwell, a senior EPD water planning and policy advisor, was paraphrased as having
said, "Although the Flint River drainage basin uses the lion's share of water in the state, it's
too late to trigger additional restrictions on farmers there this year." S. Heather Duncan,
State Restricts Outdoor Water Use: Drought Level One Means No Watering From 10a.m.-
4p.m., MACON TELEGRAPH, June 22, 2006, available at http://www.macon/com/mld/macon
news/local/14872944.htm.
67. As a mixed metaphor, this is tantamount to closing the barn door after the river is
dry.
68. See ACT ACF Water Issues, Georgia Ecological Service, http://www.fws.gov/ath-
ens/rivers/ACT ACF.html (last visited June 10, 2006) [hereinafter ACT ACF].
69. FUINT PLAN supra note 50, at 70. Fifteen to fifty percent die offs are expected at
another five locations. The Plan does not identify which species are involved. Thus, it is not
certain on the face of the Flint Plan that listed species are the ones affected, but it is likely
that the most stressed existing populations (i.e., the listed species) will be further affected
by increased dewatering of the river.
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listed species in the region, under the heading of "Solutions,"
states as follows:
In order to protect the biodiversity of the [ACF and
ACT] basins, the water allocation formulas should:
* Minimize departures from natural flow regimes.
* Allocate water for recognized near-term uses.
* Include federal reservoir operations guidelines in
the formulas.
• Maintain and improve water quality.
* Monitor water use allocations, reservoir
operations guidelines, and their effects on re-
sources.
70
The Flint Plan is not on the same page.
For a rather telling comparison of the gravity with which ESA
issues are approached by various actors in control of the ACF's wa-
ters, the Corps is aware that its dam operations can affect spawn-
ing of the gulf sturgeon. In Spring 2006, a year that was already
behind on rainfall and in which Corps' reservoir levels heading
into summer were low, the Corps operated its dams on a largely
pass-through basis to ensure adequate water downstream to facili-
tate sturgeon spawning. 71 That action prevented the reservoirs
from being as full as possible heading into summer. Georgia Gov-
ernor Sonny Perdue commented, "I don't think Congress or the
public intended increasing the sturgeon population by seven in the
Apalachicola Bay should trump the drinking water needs of an en-
tire metro population."72
Returning to the Flint Plan, its elaborate economic analysis is
more justificatory than objective. When it measures benefits and
costs it takes a wholly intrastate view. As a political and mission-
related matter, it is understandable that EPD is most concerned
about the effects of its plan on Georgia and its citizenry. Neverthe-
70. ACT ACF supra, note 68.
71. See Robert Abrams, The Long Hot Summer Starts Early: Low Water, Endangered
Species, and Congressional Posturing Usher in the Season on the Chattahoochie River, 1 E.
WATER L. & POL'Y REP. 196 (2006).
72. The Governor apparently was referring to the fact that as few as seven sturgeons
were observed in the breeding areas. See Stacy Shelton, Anxiety Over Lake Lanier and Be.
yond - High and Dry?, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 8, 2006, at Al, available at
http://infoweb.newsbank.com/iw-search/we/InfoWeb (search "anxiety over lake Lanier" in
"2006"; then follow the only hyperlink under results) (last visited Aug. 8, 2007). For data on
the levels in the reservoirs, see Jerome Thompson, Downstream Doings, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
June 8, 2006, Al.
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less, ignoring downstream costs of low flows and downstream
benefits of higher flows is not a proper way to conduct benefit-cost
analysis.
As a further point of imbalance, the cost accounting was not
conducted in the same way as the benefit accounting. Benefits
were monetized and, as seen below, inflated by questionable as-
sumptions; costs are described only in narrative terms with no ef-
fort to quantify their impact either in economic or resource values.
The concept of ecosystem services plainly is not in evidence.
The Flint Plan notes that quite significant mussel die-offs have
occurred in some stream stretches and are directly attributable to
pumping at pre-moratorium irrigation levels. 73 It then goes on to
note that further mussel die-offs will ensue, but makes no estimate
of their magnitude. It does not state whether the mussel species
affected are those that are listed as endangered by the FWS, nor
does it make an effort to quantify the loss in economic terms. The
positive effect of the mussels on water quality is not mentioned or
even compared to the cost of typical M&I filtration to accomplish
the same result. The gulf striped bass discussion is only a little
better. A reader of the report can infer that the striped bass popu-
lation in the lower Flint is already stressed at current withdrawal
levels as evidenced by the fact that the population is sustained at
recreationally valuable levels in the region by stocking. The report
then explains that additional aquifer withdrawal permits will de-
prive the bass of thermal refuges in the vicinity of surrounding
"blue-holes" of aquifer discharge that provide cooler water tem-
peratures without which the bass "stop feeding and die."74 Yet,
besides the mention of these effects and some lesser effects on bass
fishery, the Flint Plan does not quantify the loss in economic or
ecologic terms.
In contrast to leaving the ecological harms in vague narrative
terms, the Flint Plan appears to calculate with great care the
monetary benefits associated with irrigation in the southern part
73. See, e.g., FLINT PLAN, supra note 50, at 71. The Flint Plan states:
On the main stem of Ichawaynochawy Creek where it flows into Subarea
4, mussel populations experienced large declines (a drop of between 50%
and 100%, depending on species; Golladay, et al, 2004). There is proba-
bly little ground-water contribution to the stream at this location, but
under normal circumstances there is substantial tributary flow above
this point, as well as significant of [sic] surface-water withdrawals.
Even under drought conditions, flows at this point would have been sub-
stantially higher [without irrigation], almost certainly precluding a large
mussel die-off.
74. Id. at 73.
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of the basin. Due to its transparency, however, the series of sim-
plifying assumptions greatly limits the usefulness of the resultant
monetized figure. For example, the model chosen was simplified to
the point where there were only two variables: (1) the baseline
number of irrigated acres and (2) the management strategy-a
forty, thirty, or twenty percent reduction in irrigation and an in-
crease of about fifteen percent represented by granting all of the
backlogged permits. 75 The model chosen calculated everything as
a function of the end price received for the crops sold. The model
used multiplier effects to increase the benefits to reflect the non-
farm aspects of the farming activity. Crop mix was made a con-
stant, looking only at the three most common crops, peanuts, cot-
ton, and corn, and yields with and without irrigation obtained from
data collected from a single USDA research farm located in the re-
gion. The price data was for a single year. All of the crops enjoyed
federal price stabilization that artificially raised their value but
simultaneously implied that those crops were already grown in ex-
cess of desirable levels. In the end, EPD used the subsidies to in-
crease the value of the water in irrigation (and applied a multiplier
effect to that figure) to support the added irrigation that increased
the yields of crops that were already being grown in excess. After
all of that effort, the benefits were modest, at best. For the two
sub-basins most likely to be the subject of increased irrigation, ap-
plication of the model (increased by subsidies and multipliers) pre-
dicted a $56 million difference between the most moderate reduc-
tion plan (twenty percent) and a plan granting all backlogged per-
mit applications. This failed to consider the unquantified ecologic
consequences76 and the rather easy to predict tens of millions of
dollars that the state will pay to buy forbearance of use from the
over-issued permits to prevent ecologic disasters (if it acted in
time).77 In a $9 billion plus Georgia farm economy, the benefits of
the Flint Plan were less than peanuts.
Realistically, however, EPD cannot be expected to be a Platonic
Guardian in these circumstances. It is a state agency that is re-
sponsible to its constituents. It is an executive branch agency with
policies that are designed to promote the interests of the State of
Georgia. The desire of the farmers to irrigate is within its narrow
economic calculus and, spurred on by the subsidies, perfectly ra-
tional. Politically, EPD's great solicitude for permitting irrigation
use is understandable. Downstream ecosystem services are not
75. Id. at 152-59.
76. Id. at 157.
77. The cost of payments at lower pre-Plan, pre-Moratorium permitting levels ex-
ceeded $10 million.
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within EPD's purview.
Nevertheless, it is hard to ignore the externalized downstream
effects of EPD's actions. Irrigation is a highly consumptive use of
water and the timing of the permitted irrigation withdrawals
comes at the low ebb in the river's hydrograph 78 when the Flint
provides forty percent of the summer discharge of the ACF Basin. 79
That confluence of factors makes it almost certain that the amount
of irrigation allowed in the Flint Basin will have a significant eco-
system services impact further downstream. Even if all of the
claimed benefits of the Flint Plan were real,80 adding the value of
downstream ecosystem services to the Georgia harms that were
not quantified, a more objective decisionmaker would select a dif-
ferent course than that chosen by EPD.
III. STACKING THE DECK AGAINST THE ACF LOWER BASIN NON-
DEVELOPMENTAL USES
In the ACF Basin, the stressors are mounting and the deci-
sional posture of the Corps and the EPD are hauntingly similar to
other cases in which mission and geopolitical polarity preclude a
holistic view of the system. This is not surprising. The physical
deck is stacked against lower users and the estuary. The tradi-
tional legal deck is stacked against the passive user. The federal
regulatory deck is stacked against the broader forms of use. The
political deck is stacked against power-sharing by insular state
and local agencies. Those either at the bottom of the basin, or
those who developed more slowly or more naturally than the other
users of the resource, have fared badly.
A. The Physical Deck
If water law was simply a rule of capture, the bottom of the ba-
sin would get whatever the top allows it to receive. Whether
through dams that store the water, diversions that turn the water
into other basins, consumptive uses that deplete the water, or ef-
78. See data collected in Appendix A.
79. Id.
80. The data in the Flint Plan suggests that Georgia will pay a high ecological price in
the interest of maximizing irrigation. This can be seen in the Flint Plan data that makes
projections of shortfalls. These projections are measured in terms of (1) the percentage of
years with flows below the targeted minimum and (2) frequency of flows below historic
7Q10. The "in-state" effect can be found by comparing those projections for the two most
stressed Flint River sub-basins in Georgia (Ichawaynochaway Creek and Spring Creek) and
those same projections for a gauging station at the very bottom of the Flint River basin
(Bainbridge) just before the water flows into Florida. FLINT PLAN, supra note 50, at 228-33.
Inadequate flow remains a problem at Bainbridge.
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fluent discharges that foul the water, the upper state would be the
master of what the lower state received. Add to that possibility
the Western adage, 'Water runs uphill to money," and it should be
clear that the upper state's vision of what is in its developmental
best interest could often leave little of value for the downstream
state. Thus, as a starting point, the physical hand dealt to the bot-
tom of the basin is pretty much whatever the top of the basin doles
out as it uses water instrumentally to pursue its desires to im-
prove the quality of life for its residents.
B. The Early 20th Century Legal Deck
The physical control of the upstream states is subject to legal
restraint. Historically, in the United States there were two differ-
ent, rather stark, periods of legal approach to water allocation dis-
putes. One was an initial, more idealistic period as the nation en-
tered the twentieth- century, and the other was a more utilitarian
approach that was espoused by the Supreme Court in the last half
of that century. The former offered a considerable solicitude for
downstream interests, but under late twentieth-century legal doc-
trine the source and extent of legal recognition of downstream and
less development-oriented interests was less than reassuring.
In a common pool resource like the ACF, as already described,
an actor with the physical ability to simply appropriate the bene-
fits of the resource can be expected to do so. To capture all of the
benefits seems palpably unfair, but to capture some of the benefits
seems to be perfectly just. Thus, in regard to a shared river basin,
some capture of the benefit by those positioned to do so is an ap-
propriate undertaking, to a degree. Justice Holmes put it best in
the upstream-downstream contest over the Delaware River be-
tween New York on one side and New Jersey and the other down-
stream states on the other:
A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It
offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among
those who have power over it. New York has the
physical power to cut off all the water within its ju-
risdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a power to
the destruction of the interest of lower States could
not be tolerated. And on the other hand equally little
could New Jersey be permitted to require New York
to give up its power altogether in order that the river
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might come down to it undiminished.81
Therefore, to a degree, Georgia, the upstream state in the ACF ba-
sin, cannot be required to give up its power altogether in order
that the river might come down undiminished. In light of the
complex demands for basin water posed by millions of people in a
technologically sophisticated world, it is simply not productive to
discuss total restoration of natural flow. In sharing the resource
equitably, the easiest kinds of comparisons to draw upon are com-
parisons of similar uses. The best examples of these arise in the
western states under the prior appropriation doctrine because of
the convergence of both the law and the manner in which water
use historically proceeds. Water rights under prior appropriation
have four elements: (1) diversion of (2) unappropriated water from
(3) a natural stream and (4) application to a beneficial use. In the
East, there may be times when laws and uses upstream and down-
stream are both similar, as when the principal functions of a wa-
terway are municipal supply and navigation. More often the uses
are not commensurate and similar. The water needs of river estu-
aries tend not to be the same as the needs upstream. Upstream
states and their municipalities may value power generation, flat
water recreation behind dams, navigation, municipal source water,
and sewage disposal. Downstream states may not make the same
uses because of tidal effects or a different topography. When the
upstream and downstream uses diverge, comparison and equitable
balancing are more difficult. However, what Justice Holmes
makes abundantly clear is that the interests of the downstream
state are on par with those of the upstream state. The difficulty of
comparison and balancing the full spectrum of a state's interests,
including flow regime and ecosystem services, does not make their
virtual destruction a legally permissible choice.
Despite the idea of rivers as treasures and similar platitudes,
flow protection for its own sake has not fared well in the history of
water law. With the possible exception of the English doctrine of
natural flow riparianism that held sway in England for perhaps
250 years, the world's history of water management and law in re-
lation to water management supports the concept that water is not
a mere natural amenity but is, instead, used by humankind as an
instrumentality of human effort to improve human welfare.82
81. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
82. Even this token adherence to flow for its own sake may be overstated. Professor
Morton Horowitz' now famous article and book have explained that aspect of English law as
being tolerable in that period because it supported all the uses that were being made of the
water under the topographic, economic, and social conditions prevailing in England in that
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American water law is distinctly instrumental in the same re-
gard-inexorably, the law has been molded to fit the needs of soci-
ety to use the water beneficially.83 Ecosystem services accounting
puts flow and non-developmental uses of water back into the bal-
ance as a substantial (non de minimis) state interest, a point that
tends to be eclipsed by some of the Court's later interstate water
decisions.
C. The Late 20th Century Legal Deck
The technological capacity to impound, divert, and befoul water
courses has reached levels that were barely imaginable, and surely
unattainable, at this nation's founding. That may help explain
why water was largely unaddressed by the Constitution. The
scant bits of legal governance given to water basins by the Consti-
tution exist by extrusion from the interstate Commerce Clause 4,
the Necessary and Proper Clause85, the Property Clause8 6, and the
Tenth Amendment. 87 The principal method of adjusting state in-
terests when states sue one another,88 absent a negotiated agree-
ment, is the doctrine of equitable apportionment supported by the
grant of original jurisdiction to the United States Supreme Court.8 9
The major question in equitable apportionments, 90 of course, is
the one implicitly posed by Justice Holmes: to what extent are up-
stream states, having the physical power to control what happens
downstream, constrained by legal doctrine in their chosen use and
period. See Morton Horwitz, The Transformation in the Concept of Property in American
Law, 1780-1860, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1973); see also SAX, LEGAL CONTROL, supra note
36, at 39-47.
83. See Robert Abrams, Charting the Course of Riparianism: An Instrumentalist The-
ory of Change, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1381 (1989).
84. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
85. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 18.
86. U.S. CONST. art. 1 § 8, cl. 8.
87. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
88. There are, in fact, four methods of interstate water allocation: interstate compact,
congressional apportionment, equitable apportionment by the Supreme Court, and private
litigation regarding rights to waters of an interstate stream. See, e.g., Robert Abrams, In-
terstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer for Eastern States, 25 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L. REV. 155 (2002). For the ACF Basin, the agreement needed for compact allocation
is absent. Congressional apportionment is rare. SAX, LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 36, at
835-36. Recently, Congress has shown a willingness to use that device when there is inter-
state agreement where there are major federal interests (usually tribal concerns) that re-
quire funding or protection. Id. at 836-37 Private litigation does not address the full extent
of upstream or downstream claims. Id. at 874-78.
89. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
90. Professor Tarlock has compiled an excellent summary of equitable apportionment
jurisprudence. See A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Up-
dated, and Restated, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 381 (1985) [hereinafter A. Dan Tarlock, Equitable
Apportionment].
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managerial imperatives of the water?91 This is a question not sus-
ceptible to a succinct answer. Originally, the United States Su-
preme Court gave an answer to that question that held great
promise for downstream or later developing states unlike the con-
ventional modern doctrine announced in Colorado v. New Mexico.92
The first equitable apportionment case was Kansas v. Colo-
rado.93 It stressed the sovereign equality of the states, helping to
build the tradition upon which Justice Holmes relied in New Jersey
v. New York. 94 Justice Brewer speaking for the Court in Kansas v.
Colorado stated:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the
states to each other, is that of equality of right. Each
state stands on the same level with all the rest. It
can impose its own legislation on no one of the oth-
ers, and is bound to yield its own views to none....
We must consider the effect of what has been done
upon the conditions in the respective states, and so
adjust the dispute upon the basis of equality of
rights as to secure as far as possible to Colorado the
benefits of irrigation without depriving Kansas of
the like beneficial effects of a flowing stream. 95
While intervening decisions, in the main, kept faith with the "car-
dinal rule of equality of right," the Court's apparent desire to give
more predictability to equitable apportionment led to a pair of
opinions apportioning the Vermejo River between Colorado and
New Mexico that, in effect, defined a series of elements of a cause
of action and announced burdens and standards of proof that must
be met by states seeking to obtain a decree from the court.96 The
most salient facts for present purposes are that New Mexico
claimed that her water users had already put the entire flow of the
river to beneficial use. Colorado, the upstream state, had ap-
proved plans to allow a headwater diversion of Vermejo River wa-
ter into another basin in Colorado, the Purgatoire, that was
grossly overappropriated and in need of additional supplies.97 The
91. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
92. 459 U.S. 176 (1982), affd, 467 U.S. 310 (1984) (discussed infra note 97-98 and
accompanying text).
93. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
94. 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
95. Kansas, 206 U.S. at 97, 100.
96. See Colorado v. New Mexico, 459 U.S. 176 (1982), affd, 467 U.S. 310 (1984).
97. For additional facts and a far more complete description of the case and the hold-
ings see A. Dan Tarlock, Equitable Apportionment, supra note 91, at 404-09.
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most salient part of the holding, for present purposes, is that Colo-
rado got no water whatsoever.
For less developed regions, this result may be an ominous por-
tent. Looking on the gloomy side of the case, I previously con-
cluded that states like Florida in the ACF who use water more
passively for its in situ benefits faced a changed and inhospitable
doctrine:
Despite the citation to proof standards required in
previous cases, the Court's distillation of prior cases,
which had been far more open-ended in their ap-
proach, into a set of discrete, sequential inquiries
each having an allocated burden of proof was novel.
That specification transformed what previously had
been a search for fairness guided by broad principles
of the equality of sovereign states into a less robust
inquiry. It changed the case from one of seeking to
do equity under all of the circumstances and pursu-
ing the great equitable maxim that "equality is eq-
uity" to something more akin to an action at law
where an unfair outcome is tolerated as the price of
having predictable legal outcomes that assist citi-
zens in planning their activities and investments.98
While I am not ready to recant my dim view of Vermejo River deci-
sions, I am hopeful that their scope of application can be limited to
cases in which the states come to the Court making parallel claims
as to type of use and local law governing the allocation of water.
In the Vermejo case, both Colorado and New Mexico were prior
appropriation jurisdictions where the desire was to be allocated
water that, in turn, would be reallocated to support traditional
western states beneficial uses. It is not the same as in the ACF,
where Georgia, that claims to be the state making the economic
use of the water, is actually the newcomer that is interfering with
established economic practices in the Basin. For example, Geor-
gia's increased irrigation in the Flint Basin is interfering with es-
tablished oystering in the Apalachicola Bay where the flow is re-
lied on to provide ecosystem services that support the harvesting of
oysters. Under the Vermejo River cases, that may be enough to
win a decree. Additionally, as argued more fully below, there are
reasons to see Florida's claims of harm to its interest in ACF re-
98. Robert Abrams, Interstate Water Allocation: A Contemporary Primer For Eastern
States, 25 U. ARK. LirrLE ROCK L. REV. 155, 166 (2002).
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sourceplex as sharing common ground not only with the older
United States Supreme Court equitable apportionment cases, but
also with the central precept of the Court's substantive interstate
nuisance decisions. 99
As a possible counterpoint to the Vermejo River decisions,
there is one unusual equitable apportionment case in which the
Court apportioned the fish resource that was supported by an in-
terstate river, an action that can easily be viewed as apportioning
a specific ecosystem service. 100 In that case the Court ruled that it
could apportion the right to salmon runs in the Columbia-Snake
system between the competing states. The Court stated, "[a] dis-
pute over the water flowing through the Columbia-Snake River
system would be resolved by the equitable apportionment doctrine;
we see no reason to accord different treatment to a controversy
over a similar natural resource of that system."''1 Professor Ruhl,
after noting that language continues:
Like fish flowing through the river system, eco-
system services do as well, delivering true economic
value in many different ways and locations. Injury to
those economically valuable resources ought, there-
fore, to count in the "substantial injury" analysis.
Likewise, once those ecosystem services are rec-
ognized for both their ecologic and economic values,
the Court should focus its equitable apportionment
doctrine on the apportionment of resources associ-
ated with those services, which in this case is the
natural flow regime of the ACF River. In other
words, it is not enough to protect a minimum base
flow for Florida, as Georgia has emphasized; rather,
the real medium of apportionment should be the
flow regime itself.
The suggestions that the Court should take in-
jury to ecosystem services into account for purposes
of its substantial injury test, and should focus on
ecosystem services in the apportionment phase of
the case as well, are novel propositions, but they are
the logical, incremental extensions of the Court's
analysis in Idaho v. Oregon. The salmon and trout
involved in that case were the resource of interest
for Idaho - they moved within the river system and
99. See discussion infra notes 128-37 and accompanying text.
100. Idaho ex rel Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
101. Id. at 1024.
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were, for all practical purposes, what made the wa-
ter valuable to the state.
Ecosystem services, like the salmon, are eco-
nomically valuable resources that flow within the
water system of the ACF and any other river. More-
over, with each year we understand more about the
nature and value of ecosystem services-to leave them
out of the interstate water apportionment analysis
would simply be to ignore the ecological and eco-
nomic realities of river systems such as the ACF.10 2
Between a narrowed reading of the Vermejo River decisions and
the possibilities suggested by the salmon apportionment, it is pos-
sible to hope that the modern equitable apportionment card in the
deck, though not a certain protector of ecosystem services, is not a
certain ace in Georgia's hand in the ACF dispute.
D. The Federal Regulatory Deck
The federal government does not have a national water pol-
icy. 10 3 Congress left establishment of water policy to the tradi-
tional police power authority of the states. Congress seldom inter-
venes without state agreement into water allocation decisions. 0 4
What Congress has done, however, is to use its interstate com-
merce and other express powers in ways that affect water alloca-
tion as evidenced by the way in which the national government
has gone about achieving national objectives unrelated to water
allocation.
A familiar example, in play in the ACF Basin, is the power of
Congress to authorize the Corps to build dams on navigable rivers
and operate those facilities for navigation and flood control pur-
poses. The federal authority that traces to the interstate com-
merce power is unquestioned. The Corps, in turn, operates the
dams to achieve those purposes with attendant impacts on the ba-
sin flow regime. As seen in the ACF, this is de facto water man-
agement. If the use that a state favors is the use that the Corps is
managing to achieve, the state is in luck. If the use that the state
102. J. B. Ruhl, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law For A
New Water Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47, 53-54 (2003).
103. Janet C. Neuman, Federal Water Policy: An Idea Whose Time Will (Finally) Come,
20 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 107 (2001).
104. See, e.g., SAX, LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 36, at 802-08. The lone counter-
example is the Colorado River, in which the Court held in Arizona v. California, 373 U.S.
546 (1963), that Congress had apportioned the river in the Boulder Canyon Project Act,
which was deemed to allocate the water on a basis that had been resisted by Arizona.
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is seeking to achieve is at odds with the Corps' operating plan, the
state is out of luck. The fate of the upper basin states on the Mis-
souri is the most recent and most visible case in point. There, ef-
forts to force the Corps to revise the Master Manual to support the
burgeoning recreational tourism industry has been trumped by the
Corps, whose actions within the jurisdiction enjoy the mantle of
federal supremacy. 10 5 There is no reason to expect the Corps to
take actions that materially advance Florida's desire to maintain
and improve ecosystem services in the ACF, unless it happens as a
felicitous by-product of the Corps pursuing its narrower statutory
missions. 106
E. The Political Deck
The political deck is stacked against power-sharing. Recalling
the Flint Plan, what possible motivation can be conjured up for the
EPD to do anything other than maximize benefits to Georgia? So
long as the only significant costs of greater upstream consumption
are felt exclusively out-of-state and farther downstream, there is
no counterweight to serving constituent self-interest. Floridians
do not vote for Governor Perdue of Georgia, or the legislature that
passed the Georgia Water Code, or the judges who review EPD's
actions. If anything, the we-they (Georgia-Florida) distribution of
benefits and costs makes the result a political no-brainer for Geor-
gia politicians, bureaucrats, and popularly elected local judges.
The opposite course of action is politically risky, if not suicidal. 10 7
105. See In re Operation of the Mo. River Sys. Litig., 421 F.3d 618 (8th Cir. 2005). En-
vironmental groups won an early skirmish on the issue, see Am. Rivers v. U.S. Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 271 F. Supp. 2d 230 (D.D.C. 2003).
106. The Corps and other federal agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) are, at times, more like pawns whose regulatory power is being used as
a small handle by persons seeking to block or obtain a certain result. One high profile ex-
ample is the decades long efforts of North Carolina to defeat an eighty-two mgd diversion
from the Roanoke River at Lake Gaston, just above the North Carolina border, that was
going to be shipped via pipeline to Virginia Beach, Virginia. In that instance, North Caro-
lina tried to prevent needed federal agency approvals of rights of way and similar agency
decisions having almost nothing to do with water allocation as a means of defeating the
project. See, e.g., SAX, LEGAL CONTROL, supra note 36, at 87-97.
107. That word has been used in relation to interstate water controversies by none less
than Justice Holmes to stand for nearly the opposite proposition than that being suggested
here. Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911), involved a private interstate water use dispute
between upstream Montana junior appropriators whose rights were created pursuant to
Montana law and a downstream senior appropriator whose right was created under Wyo-
ming law. The case had been litigated originally in Montana federal court because the
Wyoming senior could not get Wyoming personal jurisdiction over defendants. This was
prior to the overturning of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) and jurisdiction was still
unavailable. That plaintiff eschewed going to Montana state court, likely fearing local bias
in favor of the home state Montana junior appropriators. Earlier litigation over the same
stream stretch seems to demonstrate that the Montana juniors were aware of the Wyoming
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A recent water story from Idaho highlights the power of water
as a political hot button for voters. 10 8 As part of the ongoing Snake
River Basin General Adjudication, the Idaho Supreme Court ruled
on claims asserted by the United States seeking federal reserved
water rights. Recognizing such rights, in effect, would reduce the
amount of water available for appropriation by Idaho's water us-
ers. One such claim was for a reservation of all unappropriated
water of Snake River tributaries flowing into three federal wilder-
ness areas in Idaho. Initially, in a three-to-two decision, the Idaho
Supreme Court upheld the lower court's ruling awarding such
rights as necessary to fulfill the wilderness purposes.109 Public up-
roar at the decision led the court to grant a rehearing. While the
rehearing was underway, the author of the suspended majority
opinion, Justice Silak, was soundly defeated in her bid for reelec-
tion by an opponent who had made the granting of reserved rights
an issue. Catching the political drift, on reconsideration, one of
the other justices, who had been in the original majority and who
was about to face reelection, switched sides so that a new majority
position emerged and denied the federal claim. 110 Quite unsurpris-
ingly, the politically wary Idaho Supreme Court also found no fed-
eral reserved water rights for the benefit of the Deer Flats and
Minidoka Wildlife Refuges."' In that later case the reserved
rights would have guaranteed minimum instream flows necessary
to maintain the separation of islands that provided migratory bird
habitat safe from terrestrial predators.
The moral to be drawn from the Idaho story for interstate ba-
sins is little different than in its original context. It really does not
matter that the "outsider" in the Idaho case was the federal gov-
ernment. The political pressure to serve the interests of in-state
water users, whose rights are dependent on their state having as
large an entitlement as possible, is extraordinary. Out-of-state
water users in competition with in-state users should not expect
seniors and built their elaborate diversion works anyway. In a rather odd blend of pragma-
tism and idealism, Justice Holmes ruled that Montana would give comity and recognize the
right of a Wyoming senior's right to take the water. He found to do otherwise would be "sui-
cidal" because the upstream and downstream positions of the two states were reversed on
some of the region's other interstate streams. See Bean v. Morris, 221 U.S. 485 (1911).
108. See generally, Michael C. Blumm, Reversing the Winters Doctrine?: Denying Re-
served Water Rights for Idaho Wilderness and its Implications, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 173
(2002).
109. In re SRBA, Case No. 39576--Wilderness Reserved Claims, 1999 WL 778325
(Idaho, Oct. 1, 1999) (opinion withdrawn).
110. Potlach Corp. v. United States, 12 P.3d 1260 (Idaho 2000). Justice Silak was still
a lame duck member of the court for the rehearing opinion-she dissented from the reversal
of position. Newly elevated Chief Justice Trout changed sides to vote with the new major-
ity.
111. United States v. Idaho, 23 P.3d 117 (Idaho 2001).
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much from politically accountable decisionmakers across the bor-
der.
IV. CREATING A "LAW OF THE RIVER" FOR THE ACF 112 THAT VALUES
ECOSYSTEM SERVICES
The phrase, "The Law of the River," as a water law term, is
used to describe the unique and intricately complex mix of federal
and state law and administrative actions that govern the Colorado
River. More and more, however, other rivers and basins are be-
ginning to develop their own complex of governance mechanisms.
Plainly that is the case with the Columbia, the Delaware, the Rio
Grande, the Platte, the Missouri, the Sacramento-San Joaquin,
and the Everglades. While these are rivers and basins of high
visibility, a pattern is clearly in place. Despite the variability and
site-specific nature of each basin's "law," each basin has a complex
matrix of governmental actions taken by various authorities that
create a de facto form of conflict resolution and basin governance.
Each case is unique as to what actors and authorities are most
prominent, but competing demands for the use of water are forcing
the creation of mechanisms that allocate the use of basin water
resources.
In virtually any of those basins, it might be appealing to bor-
row the Delaware model as an example of a strong basin commis-
sion that manages the entire resource with a basinwide perspec-
tive. However, this has yet to happen in any other basin, and it is
not likely to happen in the ACF. The unusual power held and ex-
ercised by the DRBC grew out of a major crisis-a simultaneous
credible threat to the water supply of both New York City and
Philadelphia-that created an extraordinary political exigency and
allowed the political leaders to grant managerial power to the
compact agency. Those conditions will probably never be repli-
cated in the ACF. Likewise, traditional allocation law, established
by the late twentieth century equitable apportionment jurispru-
dence, if not altered, entrenches the current pattern of ACF water
use and its attendant effects. Thus, those unhappy with the direc-
tion in which management of the ACF is heading, and there should
112. Professor Ruhl has suggested that the ACF has no law of the river. See Ruhl,
supra note 103, at 49. Professor Ruhl equates the concept of having a "Law of the River"
with a long and articulated legal history that combines to control the river. See id. at 49-50.
The idea being offered here has a much lower threshold, a discernible set of institutional
controls, possibly including formal adjudications, from which a mostly consistent pattern of
water allocation and use can be predicted. In the years since 2003, under this standard, the
ACF has had a "Law of the River." Putting aside the difference in use of the terms, Profes-
sor Ruhl and I fully agree that the status quo that is in place needs to change. Id. at 56-57.
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be many, need to find ways in which to influence or re-channel the
course that the Corps and EPD are in the process of establishing
as the law of the basin. The status quo holds the prospect of a
gradual ecological impoverishment of the Apalachicola Bay estu-
ary, and sets a precedent that appears capable of repetition in any
basin where the estuary is not a major population center or re-
gional economic engine.
One of the main objectives of this symposium is to win recogni-
tion for, and a place in, resource decision making for the non-
traditional concept of ecosystem services. In the ACF basin,
proper accounting of ecosystem services would raise doubts about
the large scale benefit-cost premises upon which the EPD's Flint
Plan relies for justification. Even so, a better accounting of ecosys-
tem services does not give the Corps, the EPD, or Georgia elected
officials any greater political reason to value out-of-mission or out-
of-state benefits. It is still necessary to find a mechanism that
places ecosystem services into the mix in a way that can affect out-
comes enough to force stakeholders benefiting from the current
"law of the ACF' to be willing to negotiate and compromise.
A. Common Law Nuisance on the Larger Interstate Stage
Professor Ruhl has suggested that the tort of nuisance might
be employed to advantage in cases where damage to ecosystem
services can be quantified and made part of the nuisance in-
quiry.113 He initially explains the view that nuisance can be help-
ful, but that nuisance does not appear to be capable of protecting
ecosystem services sufficiently. 1 4  He states: "[There is wide
agreement that private nuisance actions alone are grossly inade-
quate for resolving the more typical pollution problems faced by
modern industrialized societies."" 5 Replace "pollution" in that
sentence with "ecosystem management" and one has the lack of
capacity argument in a nutshell.""16
Later in the article, however, he sounds more hopeful:
It is my belief that the common law is equipped to
113. See J. B. Ruhl, Ecosystem Services and the Common Law of "The Fragile Land
System," 20 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 3, 4-5 (Fall 2005). [hereinafter Ruhl, Fragile Land
System].
114. Id.; See also John Sprankling, The Anti-Wilderness Bias in American Property
Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1996) (arguing that the common law has developed with an
ingrained anti-environmental bias).
115. Ruhl, Fragile Land System supra note 114, at 5 (citing ROBERT PERCIVAL, ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 72 (4th ed. 2003) (citation omitted).
116. Id.
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answer that question and others like it. The fact that
it has not until now attempted to do so does not
mean that it cannot, or will not have the opportu-
nity, or simply is against all notion of it. The only
missing ingredient until now has been the store-
house of knowledge ecologists and economists are
building about the value of ecosystem services. This
is precisely the kind of new knowledge Justice Scalia
confirmed in [Lucas] [that] can transform the com-
mon law and "make what was previously permissible
no longer so."117
Against this backdrop, it is worth re-examining the doctrine of
nuisance, particularly how that doctrine fits into the interstate
ecosystem services setting. First, consider the basics. Most fun-
damentally, the gravamen of the nuisance cause of action, "unrea-
sonable interference with the quiet enjoyment of land," scrutinizes
the degree of interference suffered by the victim." 8 Importantly,
for assessing liability of the defendant, the word "unreasonable"
modifies the word "interference." Nuisance, therefore, initially fo-
cuses attention solely on the harm suffered, not the qualitative na-
ture of the defendant's conduct. 119 Most typically, nuisances are
intentional torts in which the defendant is held responsible for the
natural consequences of an intended act.120 Here, too, there is very
little concern with the qualitative nature of defendant's conduct or
with the defendant's state of mind. The intent requirement is that
the defendant intended to act in a particular way and that the
harm was foreseeable, not that the defendant intended harm to the
plaintiff.121 The law then tracks reality and the knowledge of the
community to include liability for the natural and probable conse-
quences of an intended act. As the knowledge of cause and effect
improves, which has been an inexorable process, the scope of liabil-
ity in nuisance expands. As knowledge of how ecosystems provide
ecosystem services improves, persons whose actions have as a
natural and probable consequence the significant impairment ("un-
117. Id. at 69, quoted in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1031
(1992); see also Michael Blumm & Lucas Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of
Background Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321
(2005).
118. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 86 at
616 (5th ed. 1984).
119. ZYGMUNT J. B. PLATER, ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW,
& SOCIETY 106-07 (3rd. ed. 2004).
120. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 470-71 (2d pocket ed. 1996).
121. Id.
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reasonable interference") of ecosystem services will be liable under
the nuisance doctrine.
Already, the physical mechanisms by which the ecosystem is
harmed and the value of ecosystem services are far better estab-
lished than they were a generation (or two) ago at the beginning of
the Earth Day era.122 Those mechanisms and values are far better
understood than they were before the Symposium of Ecosystem
Services held at Stanford University in 2001. For these reasons,
nuisance holds promise for protecting ecosystem services, but to be
effective, nuisance law must be clear of apparent limitations trace-
able to two additional modern era jurisprudential developments.
In the common law arena, the famous 1970 decision, Boomer v. At-
lantic Cement Company,123 had a profound effect on tort law reme-
dial doctrine in the environmental context, making the balancing
of the equities more prominent and effectively eliminating private
standing to insert broad public health considerations into the pri-
vate nuisance lawsuit. In the public law arena, massive federal
legislative efforts, including the enactment of the Clean Water
Act,124 resulted in preemption of interstate common law nuisance
remedies for pollution introduced by point source dischargers 125
and choice of law limitations on private nuisance suits seeking
remedies for interstate water pollution. 26
B. Balancing the Equities
Boomer was a case of conceded liability in which the only issue
was remedy. 127 In a suit by a few neighbors, a major new cement
plant was allowed to continue its polluting activities without
change. The court found the plant was a nuisance, a ruling that
was not contested by the defendant on appeal. In the remedial
phase of the case, when the court balanced the equities, the inter-
ference with quiet enjoyment suffered by plaintiffs was vastly out-
weighed by the loss to defendants of closing a new state-of-the-art
$45 million cement plant that provided hundreds of local jobs and
a major infusion of local tax revenue. 128 Because it was a state of
122. Earth Day was first celebrated on April 22, 1970. See e.g., Gaylord Nelson, How
the First Earth Day Came About, ENVIROLINK, http://earthday.envirolink.org/history.html.
123. 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970).
124. Federal Water Pollution Control Act (Clean Water Act), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(2000).
125. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981); see also, Robert Percival, The
Clean Water Act and the Demise of the Federal Common Law of Interstate Nuisance,
55 ALA. L. REv. 717, 767-68 (2004).
126. Int'l. Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
127. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at 871.
128. For a less generous view of the Boomer case, see ZYGMUNT PLATER, ET AL., supra
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the art plant, and because the majority felt Atlantic Cement was
incapable of innovating its way out of the problem alone, 129 the ma-
jority felt it was faced with an "all or nothing ' choice: the only ef-
fective way to end the continuing nuisance was to totally close the
plant, a step the majority felt was inequitable. The remedy al-
lowed in Boomer, permanent damages, was imperfect in salient
regards, 130 but application of the balancing of the equities doctrine
was, and remains, a well-established part of the remedial calculus
when injunctive relief is sought. Applying that doctrine in the eco-
system services context can be profoundly unsatisfying. Economi-
cally important nuisances that substantially impair (unreasonably
interfere with) ecosystem services will win the balance of the equi-
ties test, and leave the harm caused to the ecosystem services un-
abated.
That is far too bleak a view, however. First, it assumes that
the balance of equities will favor the ecosystem impairing activity
and that the degree of needed abatement is an "all or nothing"
proposition. Not all balances will be as one-sided as Boomer ap-
pears to be. One thing that the ecosystem services concept brings
to the table is an enhanced recognition of the harms caused and
the values affected when those services are disrupted. Seasonal
dewatering of a stream segment is no longer thought of as a mere
interference with the amenity values of a few riparians or an inter-
ference with the operations of a few canoe liveries and bait shops.
The mussel die-off costs a great deal in lost filtration and water
quality. The loss of flow not only kills fish trapped without water,
but it also impairs spawning and depresses the fish populations
into the future. Further, the flow reductions that occur at what
already is the low ebb in the hydrograph weaken the flow through
the estuary, allowing increased salinity concentrations to come
further upstream and interfere with oyster habitat and reproduc-
tion.131 Because scientists now understand the mechanism by
note 120, at 111-14, 173-74.
129. In fact, electrostatic precipitator technology was available but not in use at the
plant. The plaintiffs in litigating the case apparently were unaware of that fact. In any
event, the record in the case found the plant was "state of the art" and that there was not an
existing technological improvement that would reduce the emissions. Boomer, 257 N.E.2d at
873. For that reason, the "state of the art" assertion had especial importance because it
made the case appear to the majority to be one in which its only effective injunctive option
was to close the plant. Id.
130. The refusal of all relief other than permanent damages has the same effect as
private condemnation of an easement for disposal of dust and vibration for a non-public
purpose without statutory authorization delegating the power of eminent domain to a pri-
vate entity. That aspect of the case might be viewed more critically after the public dismay
with the result in Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
131. WASHINGTON STATE AQUATIC HABITAT GUIDELINES PROGRAM, INTEGRATED
STREAMBANK PROTECTION GUIDELINES, APPENDIX F, FLUvIAL GEOMORPHOLOGY (2002),
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which those harms accrue, and because economists can compute
the values those ecosystem services provide, two aspects of the
nuisance calculus are affected. Defendants intend what is foresee-
able, and when the remedy stage comes, there is more to tip the
scale towards an injunction that protects the flows. The ramifica-
tions of this sort of invocation of ecosystem services can be far-
reaching. Balance, for example, the value of water stored behind
dams in spring at the expense of the usual scouring flows. Assume
that those waters have a calculable value for flat water recreation
and hydropower generation. A better understanding of ecosystem
service mechanisms identifies the fact that dam operators now
know impounding spring high flows, particularly over several sea-
sons, and this reduces channel scouring and sediment transport. 132
Correspondingly, the failure of channel maintenance exacerbates
flooding during high rainfall events, which, in a built-up region,
causes vast and readily calculated damages that can be taken into
account in the balance of equities.133
It may be a while in coming-or it may not-but a better un-
derstanding of ecosystem services will lead to more weighty inter-
ests being placed in the balance of equities on the side of protecting
natural systems via nuisance-based injunctions. In the Flint River
Basin, for example, the preservation of subsidy-induced cropping
decisions, even though it has some local economic benefit, does not
clearly outweigh the destruction of the oystering economy in Apa-
lachicola Bay or the lost water quality benefits of the filtration
services provided by the mussels. Moreover, because the remedy is
being sought in equity, it need not be a black and white decision.
A decree could have triggers linked to flow regime after which the
balance shifts from allowing irrigation to ensuring flows and back
again as the circumstances allow. The experience in the Delaware
Basin teaches that this is feasible and growing easier as increasing
computing power, better data sets, and better monitoring put more
available at http://wdfw.wa.gov/hab/ahg/ispg-app-tfluvialgeo.pdf~search='fluvial%20geo-
morphology.
132. The technical name for this branch of science is fluvial geomorphology. Id.
133. Lest anyone doubt the significance of the cost of increased flood damages, consider
first the trend in the amount of flood damage. The National Weather Service for the most
recent three year period (2001-03 in the public data set) estimated the annual average flood
damage at $3 billion. The long term trend is that damages (in 1995 constant dollars) from
floods are rising and rising. See Flood Damage in the United States: National Data Set,
http://www.flooddamagedata.org/national.html (last visited Aug. 7, 2007). Consider also the
way the insurance industry, which is very interested in minimizing their responsibility to
reimburse such losses, handles the matter with flood zone coverage exclusions that leave
property owners to seek their solace in the largess of the federally subsidized flood insur-
ance program. See generally Oliver A. Houck, Rising Water: The National Flood Insurance
Program and Louisiana, 60 TUL. L. REV. 61, 66 (1985).
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accurate modeling in reach.
Second, even if the balance of equities favors continuation of
the ecosystem impairing activity, if the impact on the ecosystem
services is substantial, 34 a damage award will be made. Obvi-
ously, damages alone do not stop the impairment of ecosystem ser-
vices, but they are far from worthless. Damages provide a deter-
rent to similar conduct by others. Damages increase the attrac-
tiveness of investing in ameliorative actions that would reduce the
damage. Damages provide a fund that can support remedial ac-
tivities including, but not limited to, habitat improvement, stock-
ing, mussel reintroduction, and land retirement. Thus, recogniz-
ing the routine availability of at least a damage remedy, via nui-
sance actions for harms to ecosystem services, internalizes those
costs, prompts an interest in avoiding the cost that was not pre-
sent before, and funds restoration. 135 The deterrent value of the
damage remedy in ecosystem services cases increases as a function
of the certainty of liability and value of the harm to ecosystem ser-
vices. The exponential growth in contemporary understanding of
ecosystem services increases both the certainty of liability in nui-
sance, the values at stake (by either shifting the balance of the eq-
uities or increasing the deterrent value of damages), and the
lengths to which project proponents will go to avoid impairment of
ecosystem services in the first instance. 136
C. States as Interstate Nuisance Complainants
A further consideration in relation to the balancing of equities
doctrine is the distinction between private nuisance actions and
public nuisance actions. The latter have an intuitively greater
claim on the court's conscience because, usually, they are brought
in the name of the government by the public servant responsible
for protecting the public health and safety. 137 Even more dramati-
cally, case law displays a remarkable contrast between private
134. This statement is meant to embrace the maxim, "de minimis non curat lex." The
law does not concern itself with trifles.
135. There are salient limitations to the effectiveness of private nuisance in a setting
such as the Flint River where (1) the harm to ecosystem services is being caused by the
collective effect of many individual actions and where (2) the suitors claiming damages to
their lands due to impaired ecosystem services each suffer hard to quantify losses.
136. The hardest issues here are likely to be issues of aggregation-aggregate damage
and aggregate causation. Those issues recede in the interstate public nuisance context of
most concern in this article. Defendant class actions may be a method for considering col-
lective causation if the activity involved is not subject to control by a unitary regulator.
137. Recall here that in Boomer the private plaintiffs were not allowed to raise public
interests in their part of the balance of equities, whereas the contributions of defendant's
cement plant to the local economy and tax base were prominently mentioned. Boomer, 257
N.E.2d at 873-75. The public official is allowed to put more things onto the scale.
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nuisance actions and interstate public nuisances pursued by the
injured state on a parens patriae theory. Interstate public nui-
sance actions brought by an injured state are, rather plainly,
highly apposite precedents for cases in which the harm claimed is
impairment of ecosystem services. 38
The classic example of the distinction between private nuisance
and interstate public nuisance is seen in the early twentieth cen-
tury copper smelting cases along the Tennessee-Georgia border. 139
The same sulfur-laden1 40 and acid-laden fumes that destroyed
crops and timber and covered plaintiffs' lands with sickening and
noxious odors were at issue in two roughly contemporaneous cases.
The first was an intrastate private nuisance action by a small
number of Tennessee neighbors of the smelters. 141 The second,
and far more famous, was brought by the State of Georgia for inju-
ries to lands lying within its borders. In the intrastate private
nuisance case, Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron,
Company,142 "[T]he defendants admitted that they were liable in
actions at law in damages for whatever injuries had been inflicted,
but denied the right of the complainants to an injunction."'143 The
court, however, pointed out findings below that, despite expendi-
tures in excess of $200,000 by one of the defendants, defendants
could not:
[G]et rid of the smoke and noxious vapors.... [and
therefore] if the injunctive relief sought be granted,
the defendants will be compelled to stop operations,
and their property will become practically worthless,
the immense business conducted by them will cease,
138. A. Dan Tarlock , Equitable Apportionment, supra note 91, at 388-92 suggests there
are important reasons emanating from Eleventh Amendment state immunity that make
this distinction very important and restrict the availability of some forms of relief to true
parens patriae suits.
139. There is at least a small degree of irony in the ACF situation should Georgia find
itself aligned with the defendants in an interstate nuisance case when it was the principal
plaintiff in the most famous precedent favoring states as plaintiffs. The symmetry of the
doctrine, that a state can be either a plaintiff or a defendant, is noted as part of its inherent
fairness and appropriateness in the context of inter-sovereign disputes.
140. As a matter of arcane trivia that becomes readily accessible with the advent of the
world wide web, the "correct" spelling of the chemical substance was changed in the United
States from "sulphur" to "sulfur" in chemical reference works in the early 19th century. See
World Wide Words: Sulphur http://www.worldwidewords.org/topicalwords/tw-sull.htm (last
visited Aug. 7, 2007). In England, that change was resisted for more than a century thereaf-
ter, until 1990, when the IUPAC adopted the spelling "sulfur" followed by the Royal Society
of Chemistry Nomenclature Committee in 1992. See Sulfur - Wikipedia, the free encyclope-
dia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfur#Spelling (last visited Aug. 7, 2007).
141. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. v. Barnes, 60 S.W. 593 (Tenn. 1900).
142. 83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904).
143. Id. at 661.
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and they will be compelled to withdraw from the
state. It is a necessary deduction from the foregoing
that a great and increasing industry in the state will
be destroyed, and all the valuable copper properties
of the state become worthless."'144
After reciting a variety of facts detailing the number of jobs, the
gross payrolls, and the local tax revenues associated with the cop-
per smelters, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the true
issue before it:145 whether or not to grant an injunction. The court
used the balancing of the equities doctrine that provides for equi-
table discretion to do what is more just under the circumstances.
In this case, equitable balance meant to deny an injunction and
preserve the millions of dollars invested along with the jobs of
whole counties full of inhabitants. 46 Damages would have to suf-
fice as the remedy for the considerable inconvenience and lost
property value of the plaintiffs. 47
At roughly the same time, the State of Georgia, which was
proximate to the same two smelting firms, Ducktown Sulphur and
Tennessee Copper Company, filed an original bill in equity in the
Supreme Court of the United States to enjoin those Tennessee de-
fendants from discharging their noxious gasses over a five county
area in Georgia. 48 The bill charged destruction of crops, orchards,
and forests, as well as other damage, and further alleged that a
vain request for relief had been made to the State of Tennessee. 149
A former State Supreme Court Justice, Oliver Wendell Holmes de-
livered the opinion of the Court. 50 The opinion's premises and ap-
proach could hardly have been more different:
The case has been argued largely as if it were one
between two private parties; but it is not. The very
elements that would be relied upon in a suit between
fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are
wanting here. The state owns very little of the terri-
tory alleged to be affected, and the damage to it ca-
pable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is
small. This is a suit by a state for an injury to it in
144. Id. at 660.
145. The court had eliminated one claimant's equitable rights by application of the
doctrine of laches. Id. at 662-63.
146. Id. at 667.
147. Id.
148. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
149. Id.
150. Id.
280 [Vol. 22.2
NARROW PERSPECTIVES
its capacity of quasi-sovereign. In that capacity the
state has an interest independent of and behind the
titles of its citizens, in all the earth and air within
its domain. It has the last word as to whether its
mountains shall be stripped of their forests and its
inhabitants shall breathe pure air. It might have to
pay individuals before it could utter that word, but
with it remains the final power. The alleged damage
to the state as a private owner is merely a make-
weight, and we may lay on one side the dispute as to
whether the destruction of forests has led to the
gullying of its roads. 151
From that starting point, Justice Holmes reiterated the under-
standing of interstate nuisance actions he had announced for the
Court in Missouri v. Illinois. 152 The passage bears unusual impor-
tance to interstate resource allocation disputes:
The caution with which demands of this sort, on
the part of a state, for relief from injuries analogous
to torts, must be examined, is dwelt upon in Mis-
souri v. Illinois. But it is plain that some such de-
mands must be recognized, if the grounds alleged
are proved. When the states by their union made
the forcible abatement of outside nuisances impossi-
ble to each, they did not thereby agree to submit to
whatever might be done. They did not renounce the
possibility of making reasonable demands on the
ground of their still remaining quasi-sovereign in-
terests; and the alternative to force is a suit in this
court.
Some peculiarities necessarily mark a suit of this
kind. If the state has a case at all, it is somewhat
more certainly entitled to specific relief than a pri-
vate party might be. It is not lightly to be required
to give up quasi-sovereign rights for pay; and, apart
from the difficulty of valuing such rights in money, if
that be its choice it may insist that an infraction of
them shall be stopped. The states, by entering the
Union, did not sink to the position of private owners,
subject to one system of private law. This court has
151. Id. at 237.
152. 180 U.S. 208 (1901) (recognizing cause of action); bill dismissed without prejudice,
200 U.S. 496 (1906) (denying relief principally due to lack of proven injury).
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not quite the same freedom to balance the harm that
will be done by an injunction against that of which
the plaintiff complains, that it would have in decid-
ing between two subjects of a single political power.
Without excluding the considerations that equity
always takes into account, we cannot give the weight
that was given them in argument to a comparison
between the damage threatened to the plaintiff and
the calamity of a possible stop to the defendants'
business, the question of health, the character of the
forests as a first or second growth, the commercial
possibility or impossibility of reducing the fumes to
sulphuric acid, the special adaptation of the business
to the place.
It is a fair and reasonable demand on the part of
a sovereign that the air over its territory should not
be polluted on a great scale by sulphurous acid gas,
that the forests on its mountains, be they better or
worse, and whatever domestic destruction they have
suffered, should not be further destroyed or threat-
ened by the act of persons beyond its control, that
the crops and orchards on its hills should not be en-
dangered from the same source. If any such demand
is to be enforced this must be notwithstanding the
hesitation that we might feel if the suit were be-
tween private parties, and the doubt whether, for
the injuries which they might be suffering to their
property, they should not be left to an action at
law. 153
The Court approached the remedial phase by inviting Georgia to
submit a proposed decree at the beginning of the following term,
while allowing reasonable time for defendants to complete im-
provements that might eliminate the injury. 54 Instead, Georgia
consented to a longer period for the attempted control measures
and agreed to a stipulated course of conduct to be followed by the
two defendants. The key elements were major reductions in sulfur
emissions (fifty percent or more), limitations on plant expansion,
153. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. at 237-38 (citations to Missouri v. Illinois omit-
ted). The first Mr. Justice Harlan, in an opinion not joined by any other members of the
Court, concurred in the result finding that Georgia as a party had produced ample evidence
to justify equitable relief and expressly disavowed joining in creating a special rule of equity
applicable to states as sovereigns. Id. at 239-40.
154. Id. at 239.
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monitoring daily and weekly emission limits rather than annual
averages, and a compensation fund for payment of damages suf-
fered by Georgia and its inhabitants. Tennessee Copper conformed
to the stipulation to Georgia's satisfaction, but Ducktown Sulphur
did not. Thus, Georgia returned to the Supreme Court to seek an
injunction. In its ruling favoring Georgia, the majority rejected the
arguments of Ducktown Sulphur that its extensive pollution con-
trol activities had so changed the conditions that Georgia was no
longer entitled to a decree. 155 The decree the Court ordered was
quite similar in its principal terms to the stipulation that Georgia
claimed was not adhered to by Ducktown.156 Standing back from
the details, the net result in this major interstate pollution case
was an injunction issued in favor of the State of Georgia upon a
showing of substantial harm but without a traditional balancing of
the equities. The result was not total abatement of Ducktown's
activities; it was abatement to a level that Georgia effectively had
indicated was acceptable by its prior stipulation. Similarly, based
on the ability of Tennessee Copper to meet the terms of the stipu-
lation, the abatement required attaining a performance level that
allowed the continued (profitable) operation of the smelting indus-
try in that locale.
Due to the stipulated agreement and decree in its image, the
Ducktown decree loses its "all or nothing" adversarial character.
That does not diminish its precedential value. The Holmes view,
set out at length above, in which recognition of state sovereignty
modifies the traditional rules of equity jurisprudence, is still in
force. What has occurred is sufficient abatement that the now al-
tered operation of the smelters is not invading Georgia's rights as
she asserted them.
Chicago's sewage figures prominently in the law of interstate
nuisance. The original Missouri v. Illinois litigation arose in rela-
tion to Chicago's initial efforts to send its sewage southward
through the Illinois River system into the Mississippi River which
forms Missouri's eastern border. That case provided the backdrop
for the stentorian pronouncements of Justice Holmes, equating
that pollution to a causus belli,157 which became the legal bedrock
on which the Ducktown opinion rests. That same analysis of the
155. The dissent of Justice Hughes, joined by Chief Justice White and Justice Holmes
is a bit enigmatic, but seems to have differed on whether Ducktown's efforts had made a
sufficient improvement. The dissenting opinion in its entirety reads: "I do not think that
the evidence justifies the decree limiting production as stated." Georgia v. Tennessee Cop-
per Co., 237 U.S. 474, 478 (1915).
156. Id. The Court subsequently revisited its decree and made minor changes in its
terms. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
157. Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 520-21 (1906).
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sovereign's right to be free of harm to its sovereign interests, not
the previously described equitable apportionment doctrine, was at
the forefront in the interstate litigation initiated by the Great
Lakes states challenging Illinois' use of Great Lakes water to
"flush" that sewage southward. 58
The Chicago Diversion interstate litigation 9 has far more in
common with the interstate nuisance cases than it does with late
twentieth century equitable apportionment cases. Most simply, in
Wisconsin and Michigan v. Illinois, 160 the other Great Lakes states
sought an injunction against Illinois in their quasi-sovereign ca-
pacities against activities taking place in Illinois that caused sub-
stantial interference with enjoyment of lands and waters in their
states. In that case, the complainant states alleged that the Chi-
cago Diversion, as it was being operated at the time, was causing a
drop in water levels on Lake Michigan and the downstream lakes
of approximately six inches. That reduction in flow and channel
depth, in turn, resulted in substantial lost carriage capacity, lost
hydropower generation, and some adverse shoreline lakefront ef-
fects. The Court, relying on extensive quantified findings compiled
by Special Master (and former Justice) Charles Evans Hughes,
confirmed that the magnitude and extent of those "great losses" of
the complainant states "are made apparent by these figures.''
After concluding that only a bit less than one-half of the water be-
ing diverted was authorized by the Secretary of the Army pursuant
to proper exercise of congressionally delegated authority, the Court
referred the case to the Special Master for "the restoration of just
rights to the complainants" in a manner "as speedy as practica-
ble."'1 2 The Court called for abatement, not balancing.
The Master subsequently recommended, and the Court ap-
proved, a decree 6 3 that put Illinois on an eight-year schedule and
reduced the diversion by almost eighty percent. Importantly, a
158. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426
(1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). Ironi-
cally, by the time of the later litigation, Missouri, joined by the other downstream Missis-
sippi River states, intervened on the side of Illinois because they now were enjoying river
navigation benefits supported in part by the diverted Great Lakes water.
159. There also is Chicago Diversion litigation commenced by the United States on
behalf of the Corps of Engineers to compel the corporate entity operating the waterworks
and to abide permit limitations imposed on diversion pursuant to Corps authority granted
by the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899. See Sanitary Dist. of Chicago v. United States, 266
U.S. 405 (1925).
160. See 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930); Wisconsin v.
Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
161. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 409 (1929).
162. Id. at 421.
163. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930).
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reduction to that level of diversion corresponded to a level where
earlier findings of the Special Master indicated the harms to the
complainant states would be slight. Thus, there would be no need
for further abatement because at that level of diversion, the com-
plainant states already would no longer be suffering legally cogni-
zable injury. Importantly for public health, the Court affirmed the
Master's recommendation that the effluent from the treatment
plants that Chicago was required to construct under the decree
would be channeled south out of the basin.16 4 The Court also al-
lowed a small incremental withdrawal for domestic use. 165
There are three important ways in which the Chicago Diver-
sion litigation indicates that its jurisprudence is more firmly part
of the interstate tort line than the equitable apportionment line.
First, the Court does not treat Illinois as having any interest in
allocating or using the water in ways that might impose adverse
consequences on its neighbors. The Court did not ask the Special
Master to recommend an apportionment of the water; it asked him
to recommend a decree that would abate the injury. Second, the
key finding is like that in a nuisance case, and also like that of a
potential ACF ecosystem services case. The linchpin of placing li-
ability on Illinois turns solely on the degree of injury to the com-
plainant states which was found to be "great" and "apparent."'' 66
That same concern for substantial injury limits the scope of the
required abatement. Third, there is no balancing of the equities.
The public health importance of Illinois' use of the water to send
the huge volumes of sewage away from Lake Michigan and out of
the otherwise stagnant waters of the Chicago River was obvious.
Again, like Ducktown, the Court had an available outcome that
was not an all or nothing result. The federally permitted level of
diversion, supported by the Corps' power over navigation, and the
new reduced level of diversion at which Chicago was expected to
operate the system, were sufficient to solve the public health prob-
lem without unacceptable harm to the complainant states.
The Chicago Diversion litigation bears only a superficial re-
semblance to the Court's equitable apportionment jurisprudence: it
involves water diversion and an interstate resource. Professor
Hall has commented about the Chicago Diversion litigation:
164. The Court's opinion openly questioned the wisdom of the Great Lakes states in
seeking to have the effluent discharge returned to Lake Michigan ("we are somewhat sur-
prised that the complainants should desire the effluent returned," id. at 200), and showed
more common sense than the complainants by rejecting that request.
165. Id. at 200.
166. Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. at 409.
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It is notable that the Supreme Court's opinions
in the Chicago diversion dispute make only minor
references to the Court's previous (primarily west-
ern) equitable apportionment cases. The Court's eq-
uitable apportionment doctrine began to evolve in
the prior cases Kansas v. Colorado and Wyoming v.
Colorado, yet the only references to these decisions
were in a string citation regarding the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction and a comment regarding the
possibility that Congress could take action on the
matter. Further, there is no discussion of the vari-
ous water use doctrines in the relevant states. Nor
does the Court establish any rule of law for allocat-
ing the waters of the Great Lakes among the states
of region. These elements are typically central to
the Supreme Court's handling of western equitable
apportionment cases.
The Supreme Court's lack of reliance on its pre-
vious equitable apportionment cases may have been
intentional. Perhaps the Court recognized that
Great Lakes water management was less an issue of
apportionment of water rights and more an issue of
defining the bounds of the states' shared reasonable
use duties. 67
Given the nature of the underlying riparian rights, water law
systems of all states involved in the controversy further that hy-
pothesis. There is a marked similarity between the nature of
common law riparianism and the law of nuisance. The Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts states the principal precept of common law
riparianism as a liability rule: "A riparian proprietor is subject to
liability for making an unreasonable use of the water of a water-
course or lake that causes harm to another riparian proprietor's
reasonable use of water or his land.' 168 In salient regards, this is a
nuisance standard and it appears to correspond to the approach of
the Court in Wisconsin v. Illinois.
Distancing the Chicago Diversion case from equitable appor-
tionment accentuates one aspect of how the case may be used as a
precedent in ecosystem services cases. Simultaneously, there are
elements present in that case that are shared with equitable ap-
portionment cases that further, rather than diminish, the claims of
167. Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Manage-
ment in the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 421-22 (2006) (footnotes omitted).
168. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 850 (1979).
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state's harmed by impairment of ecosystem services. As with the
quasi-sovereign 169 interest of the states in nuisance cases, the
equal dignity of each of the states as quasi-sovereigns in equitable
apportionment cases has important consequences for escaping the
harsh outcomes that might seem to flow from the late twentieth
century equitable apportionment approach taken in Vermejo River
apportionment litigation. The precept of state sovereignty over
shared basin resources announced in the first equitable appor-
tionment case bears repeating:
One cardinal rule, underlying all the relations of the
States to each other, is that of equality of right.
Each State stands on the same level with all the
rest. It can impose its own legislation on no one of
the others, and is bound to yield its own views to
none. 170
That attitude is repeated in other apportionment cases. For ex-
ample, in New Jersey v. New York,' 7' one of the first steps that led
to the framing of the Delaware River Compact was the Court's de-
cision to put New York on notice that New York City could not
command the river to the detriment of the co-riparian states.
Even more on point is the Columbia-Snake anadromous fish ap-
portionment case 172 where the Court made it clear that the sover-
eign claim of each state to its resource base was sufficient to re-
quire sister states to respect that interest. There is much in the
equitable apportionment cases that complements the interstate
resource impairment cases and strengthens the hand of Florida
when its ecosystem services claim is the basis of its objections to
Georgia activities. To an extent, the full import of the Vermejo
River equitable apportionment litigation must be understood as
applicable only to a narrow range of western states' equitable ap-
portionment cases where the interstate conflict is aptly governed
by principles of prior appropriation law.
169. Justice Holmes used the term "quasi-sovereign" to refer to the surrender of sover-
eignty of the states by which they renounced their ability to go to war with one another and
accepted the forms of interstate dispute resolution set forth in the United States Constitu-
tion, most notably, via suit in the Court's original jurisdiction.
170. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
171. 347 U.S. 995 (1954).
172. See I Idaho ex rel Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
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D. Preemption 73 and Non-Preemption of Interstate Nuisance
Remedies
The favored position of interstate nuisance, indeed its avail-
ability in the interstate stream context, can be called into question
by the decisions announced by the United States Supreme Court in
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee 174 and Int'l. Paper Co. v. Ouellette.175
Those decisions are sometimes read as preempting interstate fed-
eral common law water pollution nuisance through the operation
of the Clean Water Act. That conclusion, while accurate in a con-
fined range of application, is not readily extended to cases of inter-
state impairment of ecosystem services.
Illinois v. City of Milwaukee reached the high court as the cul-
mination of effort on the part of William Scott, the Illinois Attor-
ney General, to bring a high profile and exceedingly popular law-
suit against the City of Milwaukee. The suit sought to protect the
Illinois' Lake Michigan shores from beach closures and other im-
pairments caused by the release of untreated and inadequately
treated sewage by Milwaukee's rather antiquated combined sani-
tary and storm sewer system. The system's two outfalls into Lake
Michigan were located less than thirty miles from the Wisconsin-
Illinois state line, roughly ninety miles north of Chicago. The se-
verity of the problem was made worse by the fact that Milwaukee
had inadequate capacity in its combined system for sewage and
runoff, so extensive raw sewage overflow events were triggered by
even moderate rainfall events several times each year.
Initially, Illinois sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of
the United States Supreme Court, as had Georgia in the Ducktown
litigation. Instead of being allowed to proceed in that forum, the
Court met the petition with its first opinion in the case. 176 The
Court acknowledged that the case was within the limits of its
original jurisdiction, 177 but found that jurisdiction was not obliga-
tory and should be reserved for appropriately important cases, a
determination that could be influenced by the availability of an
173. The term preemption is usually reserved for preemption of state law or regulation
by federal enactments. The legal phenomenon at work here is one of federal statutory in-
terpretation, by which the presence of remedies for interstate water pollution in the Clean
Water Act, a "comprehensive" statute, may be held to limit the scope of otherwise available
common law remedies. See infra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
174. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
175. 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
176. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
177. Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the United States Constitution provides that, "In
all Cases ... in which a State shall be a Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Ju-
risdiction." See id. at 93, 99.
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alternative competent forum. 178 The Court went on to explain that
the case was within the grant of federal question jurisdiction be-
cause it stated a claim arising under federal common law of inter-
state nuisance. 179 In dicta, the Court's opinion in Illinois v. City of
Milwaukee suggested that water pollution control legislation might
displace the common law if it comprehensively regulated the sub-
ject. 180 The opinion did not specifically mention the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972181 that were then being
debated by Congress, but once that extensive legislation was en-
acted, it was certain that Milwaukee would seek dismissal on the
preemption ground.18 2
Subsequently, Illinois filed the case in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois located in downtown
Chicago. The court found that the raw and inadequately treated
sewage discharged by Milwaukee that befouled the Lake Michigan
beaches and waters in Illinois was a nuisance and significantly
impaired Illinois' rights. In the Seventh Circuit's opinion on this
issue, the rule was stated very plainly: "The elements of a claim
based on the federal common law of nuisance are simply that the
defendant is carrying on an activity that is causing an injury or
significant threat of injury to some cognizable interest of the com-
plainant."'8 3  Georgia v. Tennessee Copper was cited as author-
ity. 8 4 The District Court, affirmed by the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, ordered specific relief
that would result in adequate treatment of all sewage and would
require Milwaukee to build its capacity "to permit full treatment of
178. Id. at 93. "The question of what is appropriate concerns, of course, the seriousness
and dignity of the claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the availability of another
forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where the issues tendered may be
litigated, and where appropriate relief may be had." Id. at 93; see also Washington v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972) (decided the same day, the Court declined to assert
original jurisdiction over a claim by states against automakers that simultaneously was
within the subject matter jurisdiction of the lower federal courts).
179. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. at 98. The bulk of the opinion is devoted to
describing the origin of the federal common law in this area, with reliance on the principles
already described herein. Two of the most prominent cases are, of course, Missouri v. Eli-
nois and Ducktown.
180. Id. at 93.
181. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (2000).
182. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 366 F. Supp. 298 (N.D. Ill. 1973) (rejecting Mil-
waukee's argument). This was an interlocutory ruling and could only be appealed after a
final judgment, which it was. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1979)
(rejecting broad preemption argument, preempting and reversing effluent limitations for
treated sewage that were different than those set by CWA). See City of Milwaukee v. Illi-
nois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (accepting somewhat broader preemption argument) discussed
infra notes 185-86.
183. See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 599 F.2d 151, 166 (7th Cir. 1979) (citing Georgia
v. Tennessee Copper, 206 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1907)).
184. Id.
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water from any storm up to the largest storm on record for the
Milwaukee area."18 5
That abatement order was vigorously resisted by the City of
Milwaukee and numerous amici involved with municipal sewage
treatment concerns because of its economic impact. For example,
Milwaukee's brief stated:
The decision in this case will determine whether
your petitioners, the City of Milwaukee, the Sewer-
age Commission of the City of Milwaukee, and the
Metropolitan Sewerage Commission of the County of
Milwaukee (cumulatively, "Milwaukee"), must
spend, and if so when they must spend, literally
hundreds of millions of dollars over and above what
is required under pollution discharge permits issued
pursuant to the new federal statutes. The Court's
decision will affect the expenditure of tens of billions
of dollars by municipalities across the nation. 86
A contemporaneous EPA document had estimated the nationwide
cost of improving combined sewage overflow treatment capacity at
more than $21 billion for limiting raw sewage bypass discharge
events to a level of two unrelated events per facility each year. 8 7
The standard of preventing a bypass under the worst recorded
conditions, by comparison, was not even considered by the EPA. 88
With the case in that posture, the Supreme Court reviewed the
preemption rulings below. In effect there were two, because the
Seventh Circuit had reversed the imposition by the District Court
of specific effluent limitations for treated sewage that were differ-
ent than those prescribed for the facility under its NPDES permit.
Combined Sewer Overflows (CSOs), in contrast, were not the sub-
ject of specific numerical effluent limitations and the Seventh Cir-
cuit had felt free to uphold the stringent abatement ruling. CSO's
however, were addressed in other ways by the CWA and by the
EPA, the agency empowered to implement the CWA. Justice
Rehnquist reached out to create a broad principle of displacement
185. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 312.
186. Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 6-7, City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304
(1981) (No. 79-408). The cost assertions of petitioners were well founded. See also REPORT
BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES: LARGE CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS TO
CORRECT COMBINED SEWER OVERFLOWS ARE TOO COSTLY, CED-80-40, 22 (Dec. 28, 1979).
187. See EPA, 1978 NEEDS SURVEY: COST METHODOLOGY FOR CONTROL OF COMBINED
SEWER OVERFLOWS AND STORMWATER DISCHARGE, Rpt. No. 430/9-79-003 (Feb. 10, 1979)
(pursuant to Sec. 516(b) of FWPCA, the EPA must submit a national needs report to Con-
gress not later than February 10th of each odd numbered year).
188. Id.
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of federal common law:
We conclude that, at least so far as concerns the
claims of respondents, Congress has not left the for-
mulation of appropriate federal standards to the
courts through application of often vague and inde-
terminate nuisance concepts and maxims of equity
jurisprudence, but rather has occupied the field
through the establishment of a comprehensive regu-
latory program supervised by an expert administra-
tive agency. 8 9
The majority found the CWA comprehensive in its regulation of
dischargers required to have NPDES permits. More subtly, it also
found that as for those dischargers, the displacement of federal
common law of interstate water pollution nuisance applied to as-
pects of their discharges that were not the subject of numerical ef-
fluent limitations, or CSOs. The majority said:
The overflows do not present a different case. They
are point source discharges and, under the Act, are
prohibited unless subject to a duly issued permit.
As with the discharge of treated sewage, the over-
flows, through the permit procedure of the Act, are
referred to expert administrative agencies for control.
All three of the permits issued to petitioners explic-
itly address the problem of overflows. 190
The opinion thereafter recited the ways in which CSOs were ad-
dressed explicitly in the permits and held that the ways in which
they were addressed comported with duly promulgated EPA regu-
lations.' 91
A few years later, in the case of interstate pollution of Lake
Champlain, the Court further confined common law actions seek-
ing to redress interstate water pollution nuisances. 192 In that in-
stance, International Paper Company was located on the New
York side of the lake and was discharging into the lake pursuant
189. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. at 317. He also made clear that "displace-
ment" of federal common law by federal statute can be found upon a lesser finding of con-
gressional intent than preemption of state law because of the strong police power interest of
the states and the historic federalism based recognition of concurrent regulation whenever
Congress or its laws do not make the preemption express or plainly implied. Id. at 320.
190. Id. at 320 (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 321-22.
192. See Int'l. Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987).
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to conditions contained in an NPDES permit.193 Vermont plaintiffs
sued in state law private nuisance for the unreasonable interfer-
ence to their property caused by the defendant's pollution of the
lake.194 To begin with, the Court clearly recognized that state law
nuisance actions survived the passage of the Clean Water Act and
were not preempted by it.195 This was clearly intended by Con-
gress, as evidenced by the inclusion of section 510 of the Clean Wa-
ter Act that states:
Except as expressly provided . . . nothing in this
chapter shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any
State or political subdivision thereof or interstate
agency to adopt or enforce (A) any standard or limi-
tation respecting discharges of pollutants, or (B) any
requirement respecting control or abatement of pol-
lution; except that if an effluent limitation, or other
limitation, effluent standard, prohibition, pretreat-
ment standard, or standard of performance is in ef-
fect under this chapter, such State or political
subdivision or interstate agency may not adopt or
enforce any ... less stringent ... effluent limitation,
or other limitation, effluent standard, prohibition,
pretreatment standard, or standard of performance.
. .; or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner
affecting any right or jurisdiction of the States with
respect to the waters... of such States. 9 6
What the Court did do to limit the plaintiffs, however, was limit
the choice of law that could be applied to the case. The Court held
that only New York state nuisance law, the law of the situs of the
factory and the law of the state that had issued the permit could be
applied. 97 The rationale was that the regulated party should have
all of its responsibilities ascertainable with certainty by the refer-
ence to the law of the sovereign in whose territory it was operat-
ing.19 8
193. Id. at 481.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 498-99.
196. 33 U.S.C. § 1370.
197. Int'l Paper Co., 479 U.S. at 497.
198. This is a very odd result in at least two respects. First, over the years the Court
has exercised very little federal control of choice of law. See e.g. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981). Second, the limit of choice of law was not a position argued by any of
the parties or amici. Importantly for present purposes, the most interesting position taken
in the briefs was that of the United States, which suggested that holding a valid NPDES
permit and operating within the limits prescribed in the permit, should, in the remedy
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City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee I) and Ouellette do
not vitiate the force of public interstate nuisance in the ecosystem
services context. 99 Both cases arise in the confined context of
NPDES regulated discharges. The effluents directly causing the
harm to the complainants were explicitly regulated by permits is-
sued to defendants as part of an unusually comprehensive and
tightly integrated statute for the regulation of those discharges
and the injuries to water quality that result. Despite suggestively
broad language in Milwaukee II, in the end, Justice Rehnquist's
opinion was founded on direct regulation of the CSOs, not evis-
ceration of a common law remedy for aspects of interstate damage
that were not part of the CWA's direct regulatory web.
The case for the continued vitality of interstate nuisance ac-
tions by states to protect their quasi-sovereign interest in ecosys-
tem services should not be seen as impaired by Milwaukee II or
Ouellette. Most, if not all impairments of ecosystem services are
not the direct result of a comprehensively regulated activity that is
regulated to prevent that type of harm. For that reason, Milwau-
kee II is simply inapplicable. Reading it so broadly to find whole-
sale displacement of interstate nuisance lawsuits contradicts Jus-
tice Rehnquist's own language in the case in which he stresses the
multifaceted direct regulation of the specific offending activity by
the CWA. Moreover, in situations like the ACF, where there is not
effective comprehensive federal regulation of the resource, it would
be quite surprising to invoke overbroad language of Justice
Rehnquist to eviscerate that quasi-sovereign state interest 200 and
leave a complainant state with no remedy whatsoever for undue
substantial harm.
It is important to recognize that Illinois, despite being denied
the degree of abatement of Milwaukee's discharges that it sought
phase, be a complete defense to an injunction. See Brief for the United States et al. as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance, Int'l. Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987)
(No. 85-1223). The Court, even though it went well beyond the positions of the parties to
decide the case, declined to go in this direction, thereby rejecting preemption of the abate-
ment remedy in the presence of permit compliance. Id.
199. Ouellette is not even a public nuisance action and does not involve a remedy simi-
lar to that sought by Georgia in Ducktown or by the Great Lakes states in the Chicago Di-
version litigation. Moreover, Ouellette does not cut off common law remedies, including
possible abatement. Plaintiffs will be able to obtain a fair application of source state nui-
sance law. Allowing the case to proceed in the courts of the victim state (Vermont) was a
reasonable assurance that New York nuisance law would be honestly applied as required by
full faith and credit, and the equities fairly balanced without the fear of a local New York
judge protecting the local polluting entity against loss or abatement if warranted.
200. It would be even more surprising to find Justice Rehnquist as the intentional ar-
chitect of a doctrine that allowed speculative characterizations of federal legislation to de-
base a long-recognized core element of state sovereignty. Cf. David L. Shapiro, Mr. Justice
Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90 HARV. L. REV. 293 (1976).
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in the common law action, still obtained a remedy that substan-
tially improved water quality and reduced impairment caused by
Milwaukee to a reasonable level. The CWA, which was not in
place when Illinois originally sued, provided an effective remedy,
albeit a less demanding one, than the District Court was willing to
grant in the nuisance litigation. Milwaukee improved the ade-
quacy of its sewage treatment and vastly reduced the frequency of
CSO bypasses. In that regard, the outcome in Illinois v. Milwau-
kee has a great deal in common with the levels of abatement won
by Georgia in the Ducktown case and the Great Lakes states in the
Chicago Diversion litigation. None of the offending activities were
totally abated. In practical terms, all of the challenged uses were
vital, and the "victim" state, so long as its interest was adequately
protected, could no more have expected total cessation of the activ-
ity, than could New Jersey expect that New York would not be al-
lowed to have some of the water from the Delaware. State sover-
eignty is reciprocal. In every case, however, the unacceptable de-
gree of harm was reduced to an acceptable level. Somewhat ab-
stractly, it is possible to describe the difference in the three reme-
dial situations as relating to the source from which the Court ob-
tained the standard it employed to define acceptable interference
with the sovereign interest of the complainant state. In Ducktown,
the Court borrowed a level of pollution to which Georgia had
agreed to submit. In the Chicago Diversion litigation, the level of
insubstantial injury was determined by findings of the Special
Master. In Illinois v. Milwaukee, the level of control that renders
the impairment not an infringement of Illinois' sovereign interest
is the level established by the federal expert agency considering
the composite interests of all states as potential dischargers and as
potential victims of the discharges. Milwaukee H is most assur-
edly not a death knell for suits by complainant states seeking pro-
tection against extraterritorial activities that cause substantial
impairment of ecosystem services. There will be no preemption of
Florida's claims as they relate to either the Chattahoochee (Corps
dam operations) or the Flint (EPD permitted dewatering) in the
ACF basin. No one is comprehensively managing the resource un-
der a statute that is intended to address the harms suffered down-
stream.20
201. It is important to recognize that there are some avenues of interstate protection
that Florida may seek to invoke apart from interstate nuisance. For example one of the
CWA "rights" of the downstream state is the ability to set water quality standards and have
them protected from upstream interference. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1992).
If the Apalachicola is a water quality impaired stream, for example, setting a heat TMDL
that is exceeded due to upstream irrigation-induced increases in the temperature of Flint
River source water might protect downstream state ecosystem services. See S.D. Warren
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V. CONCLUSIONS
The more extensive the resourceplex, the more likely it is that
the stream of benefits flowing from it cannot simultaneously be
maximized for all potential users. Thinking about the ACF basin
in the most general terms, it is axiomatic that some short term lo-
calized benefits are obtained at the cost of longer term productiv-
ity, whether locally or in other parts of the basin. It is axiomatic
that some consumptive uses of water or effluent assimilation uses
of water degrade downstream in situ uses. It is axiomatic that
demands for upstream summer storage compete with downstream
summer irrigation. As surely as water flows downstream under
the pull of gravity, user conflicts flow down the river system with
the water, whether in excessive or inadequate amounts, and
whether of greater or lesser quality.
In virtually all basins, laissez faire governance of river sys-
tems, if it ever existed, long ago succumbed to the regulatory com-
mands of federal and state agencies pursuing legitimate, but frag-
mented water policies. Only in the rarest of cases does a deci-
sionmaker have sufficient authority to mange the entire resource-
plex, and even more rarely is that power free from debilitating po-
litical fractionalization. 20 2 In the river basin world, the one or two
exceptions20 3 are hard to replicate. Sovereigns must willingly sur-
render sovereignty. Usually, one sovereign will have to do so in a
setting where it is also giving up a "winning hand" under the exist-
ing governance regime. Such acts are seldom taken in the absence
of an otherwise insuperable crisis.20 4
What grows up, as conflicts mature, are efforts by interested
parties to influence how the water of the basin is allocated and
used. Too often, as in the ACF, those at the bottom of the basin or
in its less developed areas, find their ecosystem services being de-
graded through developmental activities occurring elsewhere in
the basin. The law, up until now, has encouraged this pattern.
Better knowledge of ecosystem services can be a key factor in ar-
resting the pattern and reversing the trend. Identifying the value
of ecosystem services and raising the level of visibility of the activi-
ties that encroach upon them greatly increases the chances that
those values will be protected.
Co. v. Maine Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 126 S.Ct 1843 (2006); PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v.
Wash. Dep't of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994).
202. See generally Janet Neuman, supra note 11.
203. See supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text for discussion of DRBC.
204. For a different governance model that seeks to retain state sovereignty by manag-
ing to a collectively agreed standard see Hall, supra note 168.
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The process of reshuffling the legal deck begins with the em-
brace of principles of state sovereignty and resource integrity.
These principles were first announced by the Court a century ago.
They have never been repudiated, but they were not prominent in
the Court's most recent western states equitable apportionment
decision. The centurion character of those precedents and the
relative lack of intervening cases combine to raise the normative
question of whether it remains appropriate to apply them in mod-
ern ecosystem services context. To the extent that those early
cases were grounded on the nature of state sovereignty in the
American federal system, the equation is unchanged. Justice
Holmes made it abundantly clear what interest was represented
and why the Court must honor it.205
The interstate context holds the most promise for change be-
cause the traditional American federalism value of correlative
state sovereignty has been and can again be channeled into the
adjudication process. There is much in the Court's interstate wa-
ter jurisprudence that has always been aligned with this concept of
state sovereignty in regard to resources, especially water re-
sources. All states are on an equal legal footing in regard to water
resources.20 6 Each is free to choose its own water law. Each state,
likewise, comes before the Supreme Court as a co-equal sovereign,
whose interests are entitled to the same respect as those of her sis-
ter states.20 7 More emphatically, the Court's interstate nuisance
jurisprudence lends itself to protecting a state's interest in ecosys-
tem services against substantial impairment. Georgia maximizes
its benefits in the ACF Basin by holding water in upstream reser-
voirs on the Chattahoochee and consuming water from the Flint
and hydrologically linked groundwater for irrigation. Georgia,
however, does not have the right to impose a western style appro-
priation of resource values on Florida, which benefits from the
ACF resourceplex in a different, but still substantial manner. For
the ACF Basin, it is important that the time for reestablishing the
traditional principles of interstate resource sharing be now, before
the estuary pays an irreversible price for upstream development
spurred by Corps of Engineers tunnel vision, unwise subsidies, and
parochial state agency policies. The states have correlative rights
to the use of water and the ecosystem services of the resourceplex.
Georgia may opt for differing levels of use than Florida or Ala-
205. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 (1931).
206. "States admitted to the Union after the original thirteen succeed to the same
rights as the original states." A. DAN TARLOCK, LAW OF WATER RIGHTS AND RESOURCES §
8.8 (Susan Mauceri ed., Thomson/West) (2006).
207. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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bama, but Georgia cannot unilaterally impose the substantial ad-
verse consequences of its water use choices on its "quasi-sovereign"
neighbors. The ACF Basin, eventually, will have its own law, and
it is reasonable to hope that public nuisance concepts will allow
recognition of ecosystem services values to play a role in determin-
ing how the water is used.
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